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1 Introduction 
 
“Democratic institutions and elected governments…may or may not open spaces for 
democratic politics; they may or may not be responsive to the political demands of the 
poor, women and minorities; they may or may not facilitate the management of 
conflicts” (Bastian & Luckham, 2003: 2-3). 
 
Democracy as a project in the Global South has faced a structural problem due to 
liberal democracy having been introduced ahead of the kind of industrialisation and 
modernisation that are generally assumed to have been necessary conditions for the 
rise of liberal constitutional states in Europe. In the European context the right to 
representation was contested as different interest groups mobilised and demanded 
political rights on the basis of an idea that they also should be active participants in the 
system of governance. In spite of different trajectories to democracy in these countries, 
a common denominator is that the logics of democracy was primarily driven from 
within (Webster, et al., 2009: 224).  
After the second world war the idea of liberal democracy became hegemonic in 
the west and democratization was for the first time partially externally driven (Grugel, 
2002: 42). With the idea that liberal democracy could be exported, a growing debate 
has since been going on about how this best can be done, and a number of studies have 
been carried out in attempts to identify what factors lead to the emergence of 
democracies. Recently in the global south the so-called third wave of democracy has 
been taking place in a context of globalization, where political authority have been 
increasingly diffused among the state, the market and civil society actors at local, 
national and global scales (Harriss, et al., 2004a: 2). These recent experiences with 
democratization in the global south do not fit into either the modernization theory of 
the relationship between economic development and democratization, or the structural 
theory of Barrington Moore (1966: 418) about the importance of a bourgeois for the 
emergence of democracy. Harriss, et al. (2004b) argues that the development of 
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democracy has been depoliticised. It has been proved possible to export liberal 
democracy by introducing free elections, while the consolidation and further 
development of these democracies has proved more problematic. Most efforts at 
democratization ahead of such transformations that took place in the established 
democracies through modern development that rooted classes, movements and parties, 
have unfortunately resulted in clientilism and elite-dominance (Törnquist, 2009d: 18). 
In Indonesia for example corruption is still widespread and there is problems with 
patronage and clientilism. Hence, many scholars are now questioning the actual 
meaning this kind of democracy has to regular citizens, and claims that it would be 
essential to deepen democracy through more citizen participation. Further, research on 
countries such as in this case Indonesia points out that some of these problems with the 
deepening of democracy seems to be related to a need to extend the democratic 
participation from below, and re-politicise democracy (Harriss, et al., 2004b; 
Törnquist, et al., 2009b). Recent experiences from for instance Brazil illustrates that it 
is in fact not impossible to improve popular representation (Törnquist, 2009d: 18), but 
there is a need for expanding contextual and comparative knowledge of the politics of 
fighting for and implementing substantial democratisation (Harriss, et al., 2004a: 25). 
 
1.1 The Research Focus  
 
“The aim is thus to take a number of crucial problems of democracy in such contexts 
(struggling democracies in the Global South) as a point of departure for reading into 
the Scandinavian experiences, and thus see if some lessons can be learnt” (Törnquist, 
2010d).   
 
In this thesis the focus will be on taking the case of popular representation in 
Indonesia, more specifically the South Aceh district in the tsunami affected and 
conflict-ridden province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, as a point of departure for 
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reading into the Scandinavian experiences on the same area. The study will be based 
on some specific theoretical assumptions about democratic participation and 
representation. These will draw on the framework and other contributions in the 
anthology ‘Rethinking Popular Representation’ (Törnquist, et al., 2009b) and 
Törnquist’s (2010a) manuscript ‘Analysing and Promoting the Dynamics of 
Democratisation’. A major pillar in this framework is that democratic representation is 
more than representation through elections. Recent research (e.g. in the anthology 
'Aceh: the role of democracy for peace and reconstruction', by Törnquist, et al., 2010) 
indicates that democratic representation would be essential to develop in Aceh, and 
that there is a need for including people more from below and develop channels 
beyond the elections. A more specific ongoing local research project in the South Aceh 
district seeks to map what actually exists in this district of such forms of additional 
representation and channels for participation. Preliminary findings indicate there is a 
lack of people’s participation and of such channels, and also that the lack of these 
channels and the participation are related to additional problems with fragmentation of 
governance and a lack of trust in the state.  
The well-developed Scandinavian democracies, exemplified most prominently 
by Sweden and Norway1, are known for their strong welfare states funded by high 
taxes, and extensive participation in ‘civil society’ organizations. These countries have 
well-established democratic institutions and some formal and informal chains of 
representation for people to turn to, but historically this has not always been the case. 
The question then is if some experiences with the solving of similar problems in 
Scandinavia can be useful sources for inspiration for improving conditions in a context 
such as Aceh. The important question is thus to ask why problems similar to those that 
will be identified in Indonesia were avoided or at least partially overcome in 
Scandinavia. But instead of taking the democracy in the west as a point of departure, 
the idea is to take the actually existing practices in context such as Aceh and see if one 
can thus discuss efforts at making them more democratic. Thus, the question this thesis 
                                            
1 The term Scandinavia includes Denmark as well as Norway and Sweden, but in this thesis the focuse will only 
be on Norway and Sweden, thus excluding Denmark. This is partly due to time and resource constrains, but also 
that Norway and Sweden are the most characteristic examples of the Scandinavian welfare state or and could 
thus be the most crucial cases to investigate.  
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will aim to answer is what, if any, Scandinavian historical experiences can be used 
as a source of inspiration in efforts to improve the condition of democratic 
representation in Aceh?  
 
1.2 Structuring the Thesis  
In the proceeding chapters relevant theoretical and empirical arguments will be 
presented aiming at serving as a background for answering the above posited research 
question. The theoretical framework that the further discussion is based on, as well as 
considerations about the methodological approach is outlined in chapter two.  
Chapter three then provides the empirical background for the analysis of Indonesia 
in general and Aceh in particular, also elaborating on the aims and methods of the 
ongoing local research project in South Aceh. A discussion of the more specific 
problems of popular representation in Indonesia in general, and more specifically in 
Aceh will be presented in chapter four, and here the discussion also will draw on the 
more recent findings from the research project in South Aceh.  
Chapter five then provides a mapping of the general situation in Scandinavia 
linked to the problems with popular representation identified in the previous chapter, 
and there is a specific focus on identifying the decisive factors that should be object to 
further analysis. In chapter six, these decisive factors will be further investigated 
through a discussion where the important processes that led to the comparatively well 
functioning democratic chains of representation in Scandinavia are identified. That 
way it is also possible to identify who were the important actors, what kind of power 
relations were important and what were the main driving forces behind these changes 
in Scandinavia. Because one cannot recreate a range of necessary structural 
preconditions in such a context, it is of special interest to investigate the decisive 
factors that can be explained politically.   
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Then, in chapter seven a concise thematic comparison of Aceh and Scandinavia 
with regards to popular representation is carried out. Here the aim is to on the basis of 
the theoretical framework and empirical findings presented in the former chapters, 
answer if any Scandinavian historical experiences can be used as a source of 
inspiration in efforts to improve the condition of democratic representation in Aceh. In 
this chapter I will also draw on some more recent experiences with the promotion of 
popular representation in other contexts. The overall conclusions and findings from the 
thesis, as well as some thoughts on further possible steps are provided in the last 
chapter.  
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2 Analytical and Methodological Framework 
 
2.1 Conceptualizing Democracy and Democratization 
This thesis takes as a point of departure for the discussion Beethams (1999) 
definition of the aim of democracy as popular control over public affairs on the basis 
of political equality. This definition is distinctive in the sense that it emphasises the 
aim of democracy instead of identifying democracy with a specific set of institutional 
arrangements (Beetham, 1999: 3). By seeking to isolate the core principles embodied 
in the historical conception of democracy as ‘rule by the people’, Beetham identifies 
these core principles as being ‘popular control’ and ‘political equality’. He includes all 
civil and political rights in his definition, while arguing that social, cultural and 
economic rights are in mutual relationship with democracy. Törnquist’s (2009d) 
substantial democracy definition builds on Beetham (1999), but also includes people’s 
capacity to use democracy to further instrumental or democratic aims. This definition 
of right-based substantial democratization, thus stands in contrast to that of formal 
democratization in the sense that the rights do not only exist on paper but actually 
make sense to use for most people (Grugel, 2002: 5).  
 
2.1.1 The Pillars of Democracy 
A framework for the analysis of democracy based on Törnquists substantial 
definition is taken as a point of departure for the assessment of democracy, and here 
one can distinguish three basic pillars: The people, the public matters and the 
intermediary ways to exercise popular control of policymaking and implementation 
(Törnquist, 2009d: 10). The first pillar is concerned with the importance of having a 
clear definition of the people that should have popular control over public affairs. 
Globalization and its implications that the political authority have been increasingly 
diffused among the state, the market and civil society actors at local, national and 
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global scales has contributed to making it more difficult to distinguish the demos in 
relation to various issues spheres, and territories. It is thus important to have a clear 
definition of who has the right to control the different aspects of the public matters. 
Further it is important not only that all people are included in the demos, but that these 
also have the capacity to actually promote and use the democratic institutions 
(Törnquist, 2009d: 10).  
The second pillar emphasises the importance of also having a clear definition of 
what is the public affairs that the people should have control over. It is problematic if 
certain issues, such as for instance gender-equality are left out of the public discourse. 
As Törnquist (2009d: 12) writes, although it may be clear that institutions such as the 
legislative and its executive, the civil and military  administration, the judiciary and 
the police is a part of the public matters, the case is not so clear concerning for 
instance work environment. Another factor is to what extent institutions for private 
governance, such as private schools or health services, civil society organizations, and 
co-operatives are viewed as a part of the public matters that are supposed to be subject 
to popular control. The tendency of globalization is also important in this instance in 
the sense that more issues are being subject to control by market-mechanisms, 
international organizations such as the World Bank or civil society organizations that 
are not subject to any democratic control.   
Thirdly, it is important to consider the intermediary ways for people to exercise 
popular control over public matters. Popular control over policymaking can be viewed 
as the input side of democracy, while the popular control over implementation refers to 
the output side of democracy. The question is thus how people have access to some 
control over the input- and output-side of public affairs, and whether this is based on 
political equality. There are formal arrangements for participation and representation 
related to different governance institutions such as through elected legislative 
assemblies and their executives on the local as well as central level. Further there are 
also institutions for consultation and participation through administrative boards and 
commissions, workers’ participation in company management, participation in 
neighbourhood-associations and academic self-rule (Törnquist, 2009d: 13). Direct 
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participation and self-representation is of course a possible option for people, but in 
large-scale societies the aspect of representation is usually an important part of the 
intermediary ways for people to exercise popular control over public affairs. This 
representation via mediators or representatives can further be divided in three 
categories: Representation through civil society, representation through political 
society or representation through informal leaders. The representation through civil 
society includes self-management through for instance professional NGOs, 
associational life including a range from neighbourhood and sports-organizations to 
lobby and pressure groups and participation in the public discourse through media or 
academia. Further, the second type of representation through political society is often 
closely connected to that of civil society, and can take place through political parties, 
movements and organisations such as lobby or pressure groups based on an interest in 
governance of public affairs. The third kind of mediation refers to representation 
through informal leaders based on kinship, religion, ethnicity and sustained through 
patronage and good contacts (Törnquist, 2009d: 14).  
 
2.1.2 What is Democratic Representation? 
The means of mediation discussed above need not be democratic. Törnquist 
(2009d: 6) distinguishes three types of representation: That which is represented may 
be substantive, descriptive or symbolic. Substantive representation is when the 
representative acts for the represented, for instance, a leader advancing the interests of 
workers. Descriptive representation is when an actor stands for the represented by 
being objectively similar. For instance, a woman represents women and a resident in a 
village represents the other villagers. Symbolic representation is when an actor is 
perceived by the represented to once again stand for them bur now, for instance, in 
terms of shared culture and identities. 
For the representation to be democratic, the people being represented have to 
have some way of assuring that the representatives act according to their ideas and 
10 
 
interests. The essence of democratic representation is authorisation and accountability 
based on political equality, which presuppose transparency and responsiveness 
(Törnquist, 2009d: 6). Democratic representation itself requires at least the 
establishment of two preconditions: appropriate institutions and citizen control over 
elected representatives (Chandhoke, 2009: 26). For this to work the representatives 
have to be authorized via a mandate, and be accountable to the public through some 
sort of democratic and transparent mechanism. If the representation through mediators 
does not take place in a democratic way, or people do not have equal access to these 
different modes of representation, the aim of democracy as popular control over public 
affairs based on political equality is not achieved. 
 There are two major approaches to democratic representation. The first 
approach focuses on the chain of popular sovereignty from the people, via various 
intermediaries such as democratic organisations expressing collective interests and 
ideas, to elected political parties and politicians, supposedly aggregating these views, 
taking decisions, making laws, and delegating the executive powers and overseeing 
impartial administrative and legal implementation. The second approach stresses the 
importance of direct participation of the immediately concerned people through not 
only formal but also informal arrangements, popular movements and lobby groups as 
well as civil action in, for instance, neighbourhoods and associations for self-
management (Törnquist, 2009d: 6). Törnquist then presents an alternative framework: 
  
“Given the primacy of democratic and not just any form of popular representation, the 
point of departure must be the chain of popular sovereignty. However, it should be 
applied not only to the established polity, but also to efforts at representation beyond 
the formal public institutions” (Törnquist, 2009d: 9).       
 
The major challenge is thus to apply the chain-of-popular-sovereignty approach also 
within the fragmented landscape of actual governance and popular engagement. The 
focus should be on the strategic connections: Firstly the conceptualisation of 
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representation and the authority and legitimacy of substantive, descriptive and 
symbolic representation, secondly the links between political representation and 
governance and thirdly, the construction, organisation and dynamics of direct and 
mediated representation (Törnquist, 2009d: 15).  Advanced democratic representation 
is not only dependent on the introduction of liberties, parties and elections; it also calls 
for regulation of business, popular political capacity and institutionalized democratic 
channels for citizens and interest based organizations (Törnquist, 2010a: 22). 
 
2.1.3 Defining Democratization  
The framework above implies that elections are only a necessary component of 
democracy and not a sufficient. Even if elections are held, these can still exclude a 
large part of the population from contesting power, and only focusing on elections 
does not take into account if these elections are meaningful to the public. Especially in 
the early stages of a democratic transition the policy alternatives offered by political 
parties can vary widely (Bünte & Ufen, 2009: 5). 
The process of democratization is made up of real struggles to establish a mode 
of decision making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people 
exercise control (Beetham, 1992, cited in Grugel, 2002: 3). Grugel (2002: 64) 
emphasizes the need to explain democratization holistically. Structures are of vital 
importance for explaining outcomes, but democratization is a dynamic process that is 
to a large extent also shaped by actors’ choices and political decisions. No individual 
precondition or cause operates in a vacuum, and the options available for the actors or 
politicians are shaped by the structures in society. The structures can be for instance 
the patterns of interaction between state and society, organizational traditions and state 
capacity (Grugel, 2002: 65). What politics and actors choices can actually do is to act 
within these structures, and try to change them in ways that contributes to the 
promotion of democratic development or facilitate processes that can increase popular 
participation and contribute to substantial democratization.  
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Substantial democracy also requires state capacity to respond to pressures from 
citizens, and carry out policies and commitments to them as well (Grugel, 2002: 82). 
Democracy is dependent on ‘strong regulative and coordinating programmes mandated 
through state institutions, strongly linked to participatory and critical civic 
organizations’ (Iris Marion Young, 1999: 161, cited in Grugel, 2002: 31). Countries 
such as Indonesia are trying to build democracies in a time of global capitalism where 
the state is being forced to cut back and re-shape its role as a provider of public goods, 
as the arbiter of national economic policy-making and as the source of welfare 
provision (Grugel, 2002: 88).  
 
“…although international agencies support democratic institutions…in practice [they] 
undermine the democratic process by imposing policies. Officially of course, the IMF 
doesn’t ‘impose’ anything. It negotiates the conditions for receiving aid. But all the 
power in the negotiations is on one side” (Stiglitz, 2000, cited in Grugel, 2002: 90).    
 
The definition of democracy as popular control over public affairs on the basis of 
political equality thus presupposes that in a shift from some sort of authoritarian rule 
towards democracy there needs to be a change in the power structures from a few 
towards the people.   
 
2.2 Methodological Justifications 
Is it even possible to compare two so different cases as Aceh in Indonesia and 
Scandinavia? The cases of Aceh and Scandinavia do obviously not fall into the 
category of most similar systems where all variables except from the outcome and the 
explanatory variable is the same. The two cases are indeed different in a range of 
aspects, but they neither fit into a most different system design because of the fact that 
in this case even the outcome is not similar (Landman, 2003: 73). The comparison is 
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thus based on two extremely different cases with different outcome, and the 
justification and approach for comparing them will be what can be called an upside 
down comparison (Törnquist, 2010e), for which the logics will be elaborated on 
below.  
This thesis is a qualitative thematic comparison of Aceh and historically in 
Scandinavia, concerning popular political organisation and representation through 
additional forms of democracy. The main approach and research design will be an 
upside down comparison, while the main methodological approach will be process 
tracing as a method for identifying the processes and specific turning points in history 
that led to comparatively well functioning democratic chains of representation in 
Scandinavia. That way it should be possible to identify who were the important actors, 
what kind of power relations were important and what were the main driving forces 
behind these changes in Scandinavia. If one can find examples of processes where 
political decisions were behind (as opposed to structural conditions only), this can be 
useful for the context of Aceh. This is thus neither a view that one single variable can 
explain the outcome of democracy (but rather processes of intertwined factors), and 
neither a view that structural factors explain everything, but that political decisions 
matter.  
 
2.2.1 The Logic of Upside Down Comparisons2  
A range of comparisons has been put forward between established democracies 
(e.g., Lijphart, 1999). These comparisons have focused on the differences in the 
development of established democracies, their functioning and their institutional 
designs. Further, a multitude of comparative analyses have been performed between 
democratic and non-democratic countries in order to identify essential variables that 
help explain transitions to democracy (e.g., Huntington, 1991; Linz & Stepan, 1996).    
                                            
2 The idea of ‘upside down comparison’ is taken from Törnquist’s (2010e) paper presented at the  Oslo 
University Democracy program’s international workshop. 18-20 October 2010.  
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Usually these studies have taken democracy in the established western 
democracies as standards for which new democracies are measured against. When 
only comparing with somewhat similar trajectories or outcomes, important aspects can 
be overlooked or taken for granted. As Törnquist (2010e: 2) argues a number of 
fundaments of democracy are excluded from the list of ideal liberal democratic 
institutions, presumably because they are taken for granted in the Global North. Thus, 
by taking the problems with democracy in a newly established struggling democracy 
in the global south as a point of departure for studying Scandinavian democracy new 
insights might be found. Not only how does democracy emerge, as in the institutional 
existence of elections etc., but also how did the participation that seems to be missing 
in countries such as Indonesia emerge? This approach thus differs from the 
conventional modernisation school that has framed comparison so far, with its use of 
Anglo-American history as a basis for comparison (Törnquist, 2010e: 5). Also because 
the identification of for example insufficient rule of law or governance does not say 
anything about why and how, and what could be done, Törnquist (2010e. 2) argues 
that there is a need to add more contextual analysis of relations of power and the 
actors’ will and capacity to use and promote or counter and abuse democracy.  
  
 The main object of analysis in this thesis will thus be Scandinavian historical 
experiences with the development of democratic representation, but by first looking at 
the problems in Aceh this gives a useful perspective for the analysis and helps 
deciding which problems to focus on. The idea is further that once a problem has been 
identified in the first context, Aceh in this case, and an interesting solution to a similar 
problem has been located in the second context which is Scandinavia, the next step is 
to trace the political process through which this more positive outcome came about 
(Törnquist, 2010e: 2-3). Structural factors may be very different, but the politics of 
priorities, alliances and coalitions may be less difficult to adapt, and crucial advances 
in Scandinavia and Brazil and Kerala can be explained by a primacy of politics 
(Törnquist, 2010e: 3). The point is thus to see if some of the processes etc identified in 
the ‘positive’ case can help to identify factors in the second case that may foster 
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similar tendencies or contain those who oppose them (Törnquist, 2010e: 3). Secondly, 
the ‘upside-down’ comparison is interesting in the sense that it may help generating 
new perspectives on what has happened in the Scandinavian or the ‘positive’ case, 
typically because what has not been a major problem has not been addressed by 
scholars (Törnquist, 2010e: 3).  
  
 The logic of this type of comparison thus differs from that of traditional 
comparative analysis where the ideal is experimental research designs and the 
methodological logic of comparisons is seen as analogous to the mode of hypothesis-
testing through multivariate analysis (Skocpol & Somers, 1980: 175). Instead, the 
logic is more similar to that of comparative history as the contrast of contexts, for 
which the rationale behind is best exemplified by a quote from the work of Reinhard 
Bendix:  
  
“By means of comparative analysis I want to preserve a sense of historical 
particularity as far as I can, while still comparing different countries. Rather than aim 
at broader generalizations and lose that sense, I ask the same or at least similar 
questions of divergent materials and so leave room for divergent answers” (1976, 
cited in Skocpol & Somers, 1980: 180).   
 
The idea is thus that one can increase the ‘visibility’ of one structure by contrasting it 
to another (Bendix, 1977, cited in Skocpol & Somers, 1980: 180). By using this 
approach one may thus be able to increase the ‘visibility’ of the development of 
Scandinavian democracy by contrasting it with the experiences and problems 
identified in Aceh. By making this comparison with the problems identified in Aceh as 
a point of departure for looking at the historical development of democracy in 
Scandinavia, one can make visible processes or structures that may have earlier been 
overlooked or taken for granted when comparing with more similar contexts.  
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2.2.2 The Process-tracing Method 
 
“The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the 
causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) 
and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005). 
 
Process-tracing as a method in political science has achieved increased recognition in 
the last few decades, and scholars such as Charles Tilly (cited in George & Bennett, 
2005: 205) has argued that theoretical propositions should be based on relevant, 
verifiable causal stories resting in differing chains of cause-effect relations whose 
efficacy can be demonstrated independently of those stories. In comparative politics 
statistical analysis with a large number of observations has been dominant and the 
effects of extraneous variables is usually controlled by selecting and comparing cases 
in which there is no co-variation between the control variable and the dependent 
variable (Frendreis, 1983: 257). This has primarily been achieved through the 
employment of a proper research design such as a most similar system design or a 
most different system design (Frendreis, 1983: 260-261). The focus has to a large 
extent been on identifying necessary and sufficient variables, and usually the focus has 
been on single variables in explaining outcomes. Still, there have also been developed 
methods for identifying the interaction between different variables also through for 
instance Ragins (2000) method of studying cases as configurations.  
A problem with such analysis is the focus on co-variation and a lack of 
identification of the causal mechanisms, a problem that can be illustrated by the image 
of fifty dominoes in a straight line where only number one and number fifty are 
visible. When the two of them are suddenly lying down one can assume that all of the 
others also are lying down because of the co-variation, but to actually identify the 
causal links one have to look into every single domino. This is where the process-
tracing method comes in handy (George & Bennett, 2005: 206). Process tracing can be 
used as a tool for testing theories by investigating if the posited or implied causal 
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mechanisms actually occur, or as in this case as a tool for developing theory (George 
& Bennett, 2005: 208-209). The use of process tracing in this case will take the form 
of an analytical explanation (George & Bennett, 2005: 211), where the focus is on of 
how certain aspects of  democratic representation came about in Scandinavia. The 
explanation will be analytical in the sense that a certain theoretical framework is taken 
as a point of departure for deciding which aspects are important, in this case specific 
turning points that are subject to political decisions and important in the development 
of democratic representation. There is also a need to distinguish between different 
types of causal processes (George & Bennett, 2005: 212), and in this case the causal 
process is assumed to take the form of interacting causal variables that are in general 
not independent of each other.  
A recent example of the method can be found in the first chapter of the 
anthology on Aceh by Törnquist, et al., (2009a). Here Törnquist uses a process-tracing 
approach for analysing what made the peace in Aceh possible. He focuses on 
identifying the different processes and turning points which not by them selves made 
the peace process possible, but were important factors that when applied together can 
explain how the peace process became possible.  
 
“To answer the question why – and what kind of – democracy was possible it is 
necessary therefore to search for additional, more decisive factors that influenced the 
turning points in the negotiations where democratic peace became a viable alternative 
for the major actors. Equally useful is the identification of the dynamics that differ 
from the experiences in the less successful cases of Sri Lanka and other disturbed 
areas in Indonesia” (Törnquist, 2009c: 17).  
 
Process tracing thus explains outcomes not just by identifying which variables are 
present or not in different cases, and then make an assumption about causality, but 
tries to identify the chains of events that led to a specific outcome. As exemplified in 
the quotation above, this process tracing approach can also be useful for comparisons 
across cases.  
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2.2.3 Considerations About Validity and Reliability  
The research design and method that are applied in this thesis contributes to 
assuring the validity of the study. The advantage with studying few cases is that the 
thorough analysis of each case increases the possibilities for identifying causal 
relationships, and this is further secured through the process tracing approach where 
the aim is to identify the specific causal mechanisms. Further, the definition of 
democracy as referring to the aim of democracy instead of being based on a range of 
necessary institutions, contributes to securing that the observations meaningfully 
capture ideas contained in the concept in the different contexts of Aceh and 
Scandinavia (Adcock, 2001: 529).  
In this study the aim is firstly to investigate if any of the historical experiences in 
Scandinavia can have any relevance in the specific context of Aceh, so the aim is not 
primarily that of drawing inferences that can be valid outside of the specific cases 
investigated in this study. Still, due to the focus on processes, and then specifically 
those that have been subject to political decisions, the findings can also be relevant for 
other contexts, but then of course there is a need for more contextual analysis of the 
specific cases. This case will thus primarily say something about the specific case of 
Aceh and Scandinavia.  
Regarding the reliability of the findings the research do have some limitations. 
The findings from the research in South Aceh, which many of the arguments in this 
thesis draw on, are based on preliminary presentations of not yet finished research. 
Also I do not have extensive information about the methods that are used in the 
research on South Aceh, and thus the validity of the findings are difficult to assess at 
this point of time. Also, some of the arguments I use in the analysis are based on 
discussions during the field visit in Aceh, and for the securing of the validity of the 
conclusions, more thorough research should be performed. Still, the field visit in Aceh, 
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and the discussions with the research team have reduced the risk of wrong 
interpretation of the findings, and thus strengthened the overall validity of the study.    
Regarding the analysis on historical processes in Scandinavia this should be 
subject to more extensive research without the time and space limitations of a master 
thesis. It should also be carried out in cooperation with scholars that have extensive 
knowledge on the specific history of Scandinavia.  
Due to the upside down approach applied in this thesis, thorough analysis and 
understanding of the problems in Aceh was necessary for focusing the more specific 
analysis on Scandinavia. Due to the fact that I did not have any extensive prior 
knowledge to the situation in Aceh, a large amount of time was put into actually 
understanding the dynamics. Further the specification of the problems in Aceh was of 
course the responsibility of the research team, but because the research is not yet 
finished, the material used in this thesis is primarily based on presentations on 
preliminary findings and discussion with the researchers during a field visit in Aceh in 
late September/early October 2010. Thus, the specific problems that serves as a point 
of departure for the historical analysis of Scandinavian experiences was not specified 
until the beginning of October 2010.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
21 
 
3 Empirical background 
 
3.1 Indonesian Democracy 
After the dismantling of authoritarian president Soeharto and the New Order 
regime in 1998, the first free parliamentary elections took place in June 1999. 
Indonesia had thus become an electoral democracy. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, the 
former vice-president who succeeded Soeharto after his resignation, had implemented 
a range of political reforms including the releasing of political prisoners, 
decentralization of political power and freedom of political parties and press (Bünte & 
Ufen, 2009: 3-4). The elections in 1999 resulted in the presidency of Abdurrahman 
Wahid, but already in 2001 he was impeached due to a corruption scandal, and 
replaced by his vice-president Magawati Soekarnoputri. In 2004, the second legislative 
elections were also followed by the first direct presidential election in Indonesia’s 
history. The result of the elections was that the former New Order General Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono won and became president (Hadiz, 2010: 67-68). 
According to Freedom House’s most recent annual report on freedom in the 
world Indonesia obtains the score 2 on political rights, which implies that the country 
is assessed to be free (FreedomHouse, 2010). Still, recent research on Indonesia 
indicates that there are deeply entrenched problems with the state of democracy. 
Scholars such as Bünte and Ufen (Bünte & Ufen, 2009: 4) claims that the spread of 
democracy has by no means eradicated all forms of political repression as the military 
still exercises a huge influence, the political elite often uses power for their own ends 
and, and that corruption is endemic. Further, the decentralization process that was 
initiated after the fall off the New Order have according to Nordholt (2004: 30)  was 
not synonymous with a shift from authoritarian to democratic rule, and neither implied 
a shift from a strong state towards a strong civil society. His argument is further that 
Indonesian politics is in fact marked by strong continuities of patrimonial patterns and 
a deeply entrenched nature of regional elites (Nordholt, 2004: 47). The findings from 
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the Demos3 survey - an all-Indonesian survey on the state of democracy, indicate that 
in spite of freedoms, elections and liberal institutions there are problems with the 
operational capacity and governance, as well as with the popular representation and 
actors capacity to use and promote democracy (Törnquist, 2010a: 46).  
 
3.2 Aceh: Historical Context and Recent Developments  
Nangrroe Aceh Darussalam is the uppermost province on the Indonesian island 
Sumatra. Even though Indonesia on paper became an electoral democracy in 1999, in 
the Aceh province, the collapse of the Soeharto regime did not lead to democracy, but 
opened the way to the re-invigoration of separatist movements (Crouch, 2010: 4).  
Even though Indonesia on paper became an electoral democracy with the 
parliamentary elections in 1999, it was not until after the Helsinki peace agreement in 
2005 that the first free and fair direct elections were held in Aceh.    
Due to its location on the northern tip of Sumatra, in the sea-lanes between 
Turkey, the Middle East, India and the Far East, Aceh has historically been an 
important trading empire (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010: 47). The inclusion of Aceh and 
Sumatra in an Indonesian state was a decision made by the British and the Dutch with 
the London treaty of 1824 (Reid, 2006b: 52), and a common view after the dismantling 
of the New Order regime was that Indonesia was a colonial elite construct that would 
eventually fall apart. Rebellion and resistance to outside inference in their affairs have 
thus historically been a part of the Acehnese way of life (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010: 47). 
The invasion of Aceh by the Dutch in 1873 was the beginning of 130 years marked by 
military occupation and repression. After the independence of the Indonesian state 
from the Dutch in 1949, the resistance was directed against the central government in 
Jakarta, manifested through the Free Aceh Movement (GAM – Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka) fight for independence (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010: 48-54). 
                                            
3 The surveys were designed and co-directed by Olle Törnquist, and carried out with the Indonesian research 
NGO Demos (The Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Research Studies).  
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The Dutch colonial government facilitated their administration through 
uléëbalang on the local level. The ulèëbalang was a traditional Acehnese institution of 
local leaders, which under the Dutch colonial period was transformed into something 
similar to a feudal ruler (Reid, 2006a: 102). The Indonesian state became independent 
from the Dutch in 1949, and in 1959 the Acehnese regional government was granted 
jurisdiction over education, customary law and religion. After Soeharto instituted his 
authoritarian New Order regime in 1965, Aceh again lost its right to manage political 
and economic development in 1966. The Soeharto regime was characterized by a 
highly centralised and militarised system, with military commands allocated at each 
administrative level (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010: 53-54).  
In spite of some people characterizing Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto as a 
near-failed state, the central government authority has in fact been quite strong and the 
problem has not been that the state was lacking authority. Rather the problem has been 
that segments of the state were ‘captured’ by vested interests (Crouch, 2010: 5). Both 
during the Dutch colonial period and during Soehartos’ New Order regime there was 
thus a strong presence of the central government in Aceh. That means that the local 
administration was developed prior to the democratisation of Indonesia. Hence, the 
local administration has historically been an instrument for control by the central 
government, instead of also being responsive form below.  The authoritarianism of the 
New Order regime accompanied with exploitation of Aceh’s natural recourses 
contributed to further rebellion that manifested itself through the Free Aceh 
Movement’s proclamation of independence for Aceh in 1976. In 1990 the Indonesian 
government designated Aceh a military Operation Zone (DOM) (Prasetyo & Birks, 
2010-55).  
The reformasi period that succeeded the resignation of Soeharto and the 
dismantling of the New Order regime was marked by extensive decentralisation and a 
number of political reforms. In Aceh, the fall of Soeharto led to a call for the 
withdrawal of DOM, which resulted in the lifting of DOM in August 1998 (Prasetyo & 
Birks, 2010: 57). This in turn provoked an increase of the violence and repression, and 
after some time the idea of a referendum was born among students in Aceh. There 
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were attempts at peace negotiations under the new president Wahid, facilitated by the 
Henry Dunant Centre, which led to a humanitarian pause in 2000 and a ceasefire 
agreement in 2002, but under the new administration of president Sukarnoputri in 
2003 violence intensified again in Aceh (Prasetyo & Birks, 2010-66).  
It was first on 15 August 2005, less than a year after the devastating December 
2004 tsunami killed more than four percent of the Aceh population, that a peace 
agreement was signed between Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM). The Helsinki MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) further 
provided the mandate for a drafting of a new legislation on the governance of Aceh, 
and in 2006 the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) was officially passed.  
Even though the tsunami was an important factor in the peace process, a 
comparative analysis of the case of Aceh and also tsunami-affected Sri Lanka points 
out that the influence of the tsunami was related to already existing processes in Aceh 
rather than independent of these (Törnquist, 2010f: 5). In particular, two democratic 
preconditions and three democratic turning points stand out in explaining what made 
the peace possible in Aceh. Firstly there was a political and territorial-based rather 
than ethnic or religious identity in public matters, so the public engagement was thus 
based primarily on political interest and participation rather than ethnicity and religion. 
The second democratic precondition was the undermining of the separatist strategy 
because Indonesia did not disintegrate but decentralized and democratised from 1998 
and onwards, which in turn paved the way for political solutions. The democratic 
turning points identified are firstly the contained dynamics of authoritarianism and 
unregulated business, secondly the then fertile ground for Ahtisaari’s focus on political 
conflict transformation; and the broader space that was thus generated for politically 
innovative, resourceful and democracy-oriented Acehnese nationalists (Törnquist, 
2009c: 30). A major conclusion from the research on why the peace agreement in 
Aceh became possible, is that contrary to recent arguments about the need to sequence 
democracy for avoiding conflict - in Aceh the extensive democracy actually played an 
important role for making the peace possible. The conflict was in fact not resolved or 
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managed but to a large extent transformed into a democratic framework based on the 
equal rights to participate for all parties involved (Törnquist, 2009c: 31).  
In December 2006, three decades after GAM leader Hasan Muhammed de Tiro 
declared the “independence of Aceh Sumatra”, the holding of governor and district 
elections took place throughout4 the Aceh province, and the prospects for the 
sustaining of peace and the development of democracy was optimistic. As the first 
province in Indonesia, Aceh also allowed independent candidates being elected (The 
ISAI Aceh Research Group, 2010: 258). The gubernatorial elections resulted in the 
victory of Yusuf Irwandi and Muhammed Nazar who were associated with 
GAM/KPA5 and SIRA6. Also the district and municipal candidates from KPA and 
SIRA obtained a significant amount of votes, and won in seven of the twenty-one 
districts and municipalities in Aceh. Both in the gubernatorial elections and in the 
district and municipal elections the tendency was that candidates from the national 
political parties such as The Golkar Party7 received little support (The ISAI Aceh 
Research Group, 2010: 265-257) 
The 2009 national election in Aceh was the final formal step that was 
prescribed in the Helsinki agreement8 (Uning, et al., 2010: 398). An important 
question before the elections was whether the democratic framework developed in the 
peace talks could be further developed so that it could sustain peace and 
reconstruction. The results from these elections pointed towards a more unsecure 
future for the multi-party environment envisioned in the peace agreement, and the 
                                            
4 In two districts, Bireuen and South Aceh, the elections were first held in 2007 and early 2008 (The ISAI Aceh 
Research Group, 2010: 259).  
5 The Aceh Transitional Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh) was a new non-military organisation based on 
GAMs military structure and hierarchy, the Nanggroe Aceh Army (Teuntra Nanggroe Aceh), which was 
established as a part of the political transition of GAM after the peace agreement in 2005. As a consequence of 
the KPA being based on the GAM military structure, it had strong presence on all local levels, something that 
was important for the mobilisation of voters. In addition to the establishment of the KPA, it was established a 
local party in order to compete in the 2009 general elections (The ISAI Aceh Research Group, 2010: 277).  
6 SIRA originally stands for the Center for Information on Referendum in Aceh, which was an umbrella 
organisation for NGOs and other civil society organisations in favour of a referendum on independence for 
Aceh. The SIRA party stands for the Acehnese People’s Independent Voice (Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh), 
which grew out and took its name from a mass based organisation that grew out of the original SIRA umbrella 
organisation (Hamzah, 2010: 317-318). 
7Partai Golongan Karya (Functional Group Party)    
8 Not all of the formal steps prescribed in the peace agreement have yet been implemented though.  
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optimism after the 2006 elections seemed to have faded somewhat. The elections 
appeared in general to be a combination of poor administration, political drama and 
vote manipulation, and these problems was indeed also present in Aceh (Uning, et al., 
2010: 381). The results of the elections was that the Aceh Party won an overwhelming 
victory and gained 33 seats in the provincial parliament (DPRA), and was able to 
dominate 17 of 23 districts and municipalities9. The other local parties came far 
behind, both in the provincial parliament and in the various district parliaments, while 
the national political parties in comparison did quite well (Uning, et al., 2010: 376-
379). 
In explaining the victory of the Aceh Party, Uning (2010: 384-386) emphasises 
the rhetoric from the party leaders before the elections that they were the true 
representatives of Acehnese nationalism that would recognize the customary values, 
and also that they had suffered together with the people during the conflict. The SIRA 
party were characterized by leaders of the Aceh Party as being more like the child of 
the real parents in the Aceh Party, and thus nothing that should be taken too seriously 
(Uning, et al., 2010: 391-393).This rhetoric promoted a view among people that the 
Aceh Party in fact was the only party that had been mandated by the Helsinki MoU, 
and the party was also successful in securing the votes from traditional GAM 
supporters.  Another assessment of why the Aceh Party did so well was that the people 
of Aceh preferred their own candidates instead of outsiders because ‘rather than being 
eaten by other people, it is better to be eaten by our own brother’. Yet another factor 
for why the Aceh Party was so successful was the existence of well functioning offices 
all around Aceh due to the fact that the party was founded in the KPA whose 
organisational structure in turn was based on the military structure of GAM. In that 
sense the party had an advantage in the sense of an extensive local presence compared 
to the other local parties. Further explanations for the results is a combination of that 
the voters were not very critical, and that the other local parties such as SIRA - the 
                                            
9 At this time the Aceh Province consisted of four municipalities and 17 districts. In 2007 two more districts 
were officially established: District of Pidie Jaya, and City of Subulussalam. In the 2009 elections the number of 
districts and municipalities was thus raised from 21 to 23.   
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presumed main contender to the Aceh Party, were not very good prepared (Uning, et 
al., 2010: 391-395).  
Another issue regarding the 2009 elections was that the Aceh Party had linked 
up with the national Democratic Party of President Yudhoyono, something which can 
be claimed to be part of a strategy for attempting to secure its leadership in Aceh with 
support from the central level with the Democratic Party as something similar to a 
patron. The situation thus reminded more of the power sharing initially proposed by 
the Indonesian government10 instead of the multi-party environment envisioned in the 
Helsinki MoU (Törnquist, 2009c: 25).  
A vital problematic part of the Aceh Party gaining so much support is that this 
was obtained through a combination of populism and clientilism where they gained 
support from its loyalists by promising patronage, and also convinced people that they 
actually would sustain clientilsm within the public administration. As Uning (2010: 
391) further puts is, the Aceh Party pooled a number of vested interests without 
changing the system.  
This means that although the formal elections are in place in Aceh, the spaces 
for more people’s participation have indeed not been opened up, and the power does 
not appear to have shifted in the advantage of the people. A major concern is thus 
whether the elections actually channelled the participation of the actors and interest 
necessary for the deepening of democracy (Uning, et al., 2010: 375). 
Still, many Acehnese view the victory of the Aceh Party as something very 
positive for Aceh because as one informant put it ‘this is the victory of the people, and 
it will be a huge icon of change for the Aceh government in the future’ (Uning, et al., 
2010: 398). Yet, there are some worries that the Aceh Party will remain unchallenged, 
and the results from this election only underline the importance of further development 
of the democratic framework in regards to supplementary forms of involvement of 
                                            
10 The initial approach by President Yudhoyono and Vice-President Kalla were characterized by a strategy of 
secret elite-talks, power-sharing and favourable business deals for the conflicting parties in return for peace. This 
was in line with the notion that democracy should be sequenced (c.f. Mansfield & Snyder, 2007), and had been 
applied in Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas (Törnquist, 2010c: 16).  
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people in politics. The general conclusion after the 2009 election is that this calls for 
efforts to extend democracy beyond parties and elections only, and strengthen the 
basis for popular representation through organisations that have a basis in the people 
and are developed from below. Democratisation as a pathway to peace, reconstruction 
and development in Aceh was thus proved possible, but even though formal electoral 
democracy has been relatively successfully introduced in Aceh, there is a need to 
further develop the democratic framework beyond liberal democracy (Uning, et al., 
2010-412). 
 
3.2.1 Mapping Spaces of Democracy in South Aceh  
The project ‘Mapping Spaces of Democracy in South Aceh’ is a local research 
project coordinated by Leena Avonius and the Aceh Institute, supported by the 
International Centre for Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies (ICAIOS), the Swedish 
International Agency for Local Democracy (ICLD), and academically supervised by 
Olle Törnquist. The project has grown out of the recent research on Aceh which points 
to the need to further develop democracy, and the aim of the project has been to map 
fundamental aspects of local democracy in post-conflict Aceh. The approach here has 
been to map the general situation in Aceh concerning governance and participation in 
the areas of physical planning, production development, social security, education and 
access to justice. More specifically the research has been focusing on asking where, 
and also in what way, ordinary people and local actors turn in attempts to influence 
decision-making and/or gain representation for their interests. Hence, the research 
attempts to map the spaces for representation and participation that do exist, beyond 
the formal holding of elections. Because of time and recourse constrains making it 
impossible to investigate the entire Aceh province the research has been focusing on 
one specific district, the South Aceh district (Aceh Selatan). The reasons for the 
selection of this specific district will be elaborated on below. A second step of the 
project, where this thesis possibly could serve as a contribution, is to explore if any 
Scandinavian experiences could be used to widen the spaces of local democracy in the 
29 
 
South Aceh district. A possible third step is an exchange between the South Aceh 
district and a local authority in Sweden as a part of the ICLD (International Centre for 
Local Democracy) exchange programme, where the focus will be on implementing the 
major recommendations from the research-team.  
The South Aceh district that was chosen for the research is located on the 
southwest coast of the Aceh Province. The population of 193,545 people is spread 
across sixteen sub-districts and 247 villages. The district capital is the city Tapaktuan, 
which is located approximately twelve hours with car - along the tsunami-affected 
coastline, from the provincial capital Banda Aceh. Three characteristics make the 
district somewhat distinctive, and made it an appropriate candidate for the research. 
Firstly, the South Aceh district was affected by the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, but 
the damages were much less severe than in more northern districts on Aceh’s west 
coast. The reconstruction was thus not as dominating in this district as in more 
northern coastal districts, and the influx of foreign aid workers and NGOs had not 
dominated the district to the same extent. Much damage has though been caused in the 
district as a result of the enduring civil conflict, and the district is categorized to be one 
of the worst affected conflict areas (Avonius, 2010a). Secondly, even though the Aceh 
Party became the largest political party in the 2009 elections, other parties gained seats 
as well in the district parliament (DPRK) to a much larger extent than in the other 
Aceh districts, thus providing the South Aceh district with a more pluralistic multi-
party environment similar to that envisioned in the Helsinki peace agreement. Thirdly, 
with its somewhat peripheral location, twelve hours from the district capital, the South 
Aceh district was also an attractive research object because it may not be as influenced 
by the politics in Banda Aceh as districts closer to the provincial centre.   
Senior researchers from the Aceh institute and ICAIOS (International Centre 
for Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies) have since early May 2010, together with their 
research assistants and in cooperation with the local authorities, been responsible for 
carrying out the research. The researchers have concluded their fieldwork and their 
final reports will be submitted in December 2010. The empirical findings from the 
research that are used in this thesis are based on presentations by the researchers and 
30 
 
the following discussions during a field visit in Aceh from 28. September to 7 October 
2010. Preliminary findings from the project were presented by the researchers, and 
accompanied by a follow-up discussion in a seminar in the South Aceh district capital 
Tapaktuan on October 1. 2010. At the seminar informants and important local actors 
where present, including the district regent (bupati)	  Husin Yusuf, S.Pdi and his vice-
regent Daska Aziz, M.Pd, heads of local administration, representatives from business 
and civil society organizations as well as customary (adat) leaders. Further discussions 
took place in the ICAIOS office in Banda Aceh with the research-team, the ICAIOS 
team-leader Leena Avonius, the head of the Aceh Institute Lukman Age and the 
project advisor Olle Törnquist, who also represented the ICLD (International Centre 
for Local Democracy). The four local researchers who have been responsible for the 
research is Fadhli Ali on the area of production development, Saiful Mahdi on the area 
of physical planning, Zubaidah Djohar on the area of access to justice and Teuku 
Kemal Faysa on the area of education and social security.  
In the area of production development the focus in particular was to map what 
kind of citizen associations or stakeholder groups for production and economy that do 
exist in South Aceh, how these function and if there exist any mechanisms or forums 
for these to be included in decision-making. Further the focus was also to investigate 
the role and functioning of informal institutions such as the traditional adat 
institutions, and their relation to local government. Regarding physical planning, the 
focus was mainly on mapping practises of participatory planning in South Aceh, such 
as the Musrenbang, and look into the different models offered by various agencies 
such as the state, international organizations and NGOs. The research on access to 
justice was to focus on legal practices in South Aceh, and the relation to the actual 
legal framework consisting of state justice system, Islamic law and adat or customary 
law. The focus on the area of education was on people’s access to information on 
public expenditures and possibilities for affecting allocations. Further the research was 
to look into what formal and informal educational institutions that exist and the district 
governments policy. Finally, the research on social security was to generally map how 
social security is organised in South Aceh, and investigate closer the role of various 
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post-tsunami and post-conflict aid programs and their relation to government policies 
(Mahdi & Avonius, 2010).  
In the following chapter some of the preliminary findings from this research 
will be applied in the discussion concerning the identification of problems with 
democratic representation in Indonesia in general and Aceh in particular. The 
identification of these problems will in turn serve as a point of departure for a thematic 
comparison of Aceh and Scandinavia.  
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4 Problems with Democratic Representation 
 
4.1 Empirical findings from South Aceh  
As the results from the 2009 elections discussed earlier illustrates, a general 
tendency in Aceh is the insufficiency of democratic representation beyond the formal 
holding of elections. Political freedoms exist indeed, but the political representation is 
constrained, and it is a paradox that while liberal democracy and the unique freedom to 
register independent political candidates and build local political parties have been 
remarkably successful in Aceh, these have yet to impact on poor popular 
representation (Törnquist, 2009a: 8-10).  
As mentioned earlier, the research-team’s focus was on mapping the general 
situation in South Aceh concerning what opportunities for participation there are for 
various stakeholders in decision-making on the areas of physical planning, production 
development, social security, education and access to justice. Further they attempted to 
map generally where, and also in what way, ordinary people and vital actors and 
organisations turn when they have a problem not deemed to be personal within the 
scope of these areas (Mahdi & Avonius, 2010; Törnquist, 2010e: 11). Initial findings 
on the research showed that because previous research on the South Aceh district is 
lacking, a general mapping of peoples access to services and the functioning of 
government seemed to be necessary to conduct before analysing and mapping the 
actual spaces for popular participation (Avonius, 2010c). The preliminary 
presentations by the research-team on the South Aceh district and the following 
discussions led to a general diagnosis of the district that includes three key problems. 
First of all, despite the district having a good potential there is a problem of stagnation 
in the economic sector. Secondly, while democratic mechanisms are formally in place, 
the governance is poor and citizens have little trust towards the state. Thirdly, there 
seems to be a general lack of leadership and vision for the development of the district.       
34 
 
Based on these initial findings from the research on South Aceh and also 
building on more general literature on the state of democracy in Indonesia and Aceh, 
in the section below I will present some tentative conclusions on problems with 
democratic representation in the South Aceh district. The assessment of the situation in 
South Aceh will build on the five areas that the research-team has been focusing on, 
but more specifically, the findings will be discussed relating to the democratic 
framework outlined in the theory chapter. The focus will thus be on three main 
problematic areas concerning democratic representation in Aceh, which many of the 
findings from the research can be related to.   
Firstly, many of the problems seem related to an unclear definition of and 
relationship between the demos and the public affairs. Secondly, there seems to be an 
insufficiency of democratic intermediary channels for people to exercise popular 
control, and thirdly, many of the problematic issues identified can be related to a lack 
of capacity and thus also a lack of trust in the government institutions.  
Because of the fragmentation of the demos and the public affairs, and the 
insufficient channels for democratic participation, actors’ incentives to secure their 
own power do neither contribute to the further development of the district nor of the 
trust in the state institutions. In the following sections these three main issues will be 
elaborated on with regards to the overall situation in Indonesia, the more specific 
assessments of Aceh primarily based on the Demos-study, and finally this will be 
related to the findings from the research team in the South Aceh district.  
   
4.1.1 Relationship Between the Demos and the Public Affairs  
What Peter Houtzagers refers to as polycentrism, can be described more 
generally as fragmentation of the demos, the governance of public matters and their 
poor links by way of representation, and is a contemporary tendency (Törnquist, 
2009d: 14). As Houtzager (2005: 5) writes, the focus among international development 
actors has been increasingly concerned with decentralization, participation and civil 
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society, and this view is often based on a general suspicion of the state and large 
political organizations. The common view is characterized through a statement from 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) where the idea is that poverty 
reduction requires:  
 
“Shifting decision-making powers closer to poor communities by developing 
authority to local government, … [and] opening up local government to popular 
participation and building partnerships with civil society organizations” (Houtzager, 
2005: 5). 
  
 A consequence of such polycentrism is that if the distinctions between the demos and 
the public affairs along the lines of territories, sectors and issues are not clear, the 
governance becomes more fragmented and it becomes more difficult for people to 
understand the chains of governance and responsibilities (Törnquist, 2010a: 32). In 
Indonesia in general this tendency has manifested itself through the major 
decentralization reforms initiated after the dismantling of the New Order regime, and 
there has been a focus on peoples participation through civil society and participatory 
forums. This has meant a tendency towards more community governance and a 
development of arenas where the local communities etc should decide certain aspects 
of the public affairs such as the priorities of development program budgets.  
 A consequence is that the public affairs in Indonesia in general have been 
depoliticized in favor of technocratic governance, market solutions and patronage 
based on ethnicity or religion, or ‘alternative patronage’ through political parties and 
civil associations (Törnquist, 2010e: 4).   
In Aceh this tendency has been further affected by the fact that after the tsunami 
in 2004 there was a massive influx of NGOs and international donors in Aceh. To 
avoid elite capture of the reconstruction, and the general abuse of power and 
corruption in Aceh, a strategy from the donors’ side was to keep the reconstruction 
separate from political involvement by the local administration and government. The 
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BRR11 (The Aceh-Nias Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation) was established 
in mid-2005 to oversee the rebuilding of Aceh after the tsunami (McGibbon, 2006: 
347), and there was an emphasize on the apolitical character of this body for securing 
the independent implementation of reconstruction (ICG, 2005: 16). This meant that 
powerful business actors prone to take advantage of the massive reconstruction funds 
was not able to influence politics to a large extent, but at the same time, this is also 
something that has prevented people from engaging in decision-making processes and 
the administration of reconstruction and economic development via elected leaders and 
the local government and administration (Törnquist, 2009a: 7-8). The reconstruction 
thus has to a large extent not been defined as a part of the public affairs over which the 
people should have control.   
In the research on production development in the South Aceh district a general 
finding was that there is a great potential for production in the district, but that 
coordination between these different actors is lacking (Avonius, 2010c). The district is 
thus facing problems with poor infrastructure, poor drainage and irrigation systems for 
rice and palm oil production and insufficient measures to fight a major nutmeg disease 
(Törnquist, 2010e: 11).  
In South Aceh in general, economic development is viewed as more important 
than areas such as health and education, but there still seems to be a lack of a 
comprehensive strategy for the development in the district. The research identified a 
range of involved organizations, stakeholders and actors but it turns out that in fact 
very few of them have functioned the way they are supposed to and have not been able 
to have much influence on decisions. Among the actors and stakeholders identified are 
farmers groups, youth groups, cooperatives, Mukim (an association of village leaders), 
Seunebok (traditional forest wise men institution), the Panglima Laot (traditional sea 
wise men institution), Kadin (Chamber of commerce) and also political parties, 
international donors and NGOs. The main problem seems to be a lack of coordination 
between these actors and the involved government agencies, in addition to unclear 
                                            
11 Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi 
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procedures and mechanisms for their involvement in decision-making processes. A 
general conclusion is thus that there is a range of involved actors but the lack of 
coordination and clarity of the resposbilities point to a problem with unclear 
definitions of who should be involved in deciding over which public affairs. A farmer 
that was interviewed during the field visit in South Aceh actually said that in a way, 
things was better with the authoritarian regime of Soeharto, because then one only had 
to relate to one program as compared to the range of different programs existing today. 
  
 One issue that in particular is contributing to a diffusion of governance is the 
role of the traditional adat institutions such as the Seunebok and the Panglima Laot. 
These are important and respected actors in the areas of agriculture and fishing, but it 
is still somewhat unclear whether these institutions are a part of the government or if 
they are a part of civil society. According to the law of governing of Aceh (LoGA) 
article 98: 
 
“Adat institutions shall function and serve as a means for public participation in the 
Governing of Aceh and the governing of districts/municipalities in the areas of 
security, peace, harmony, and public order. Resolution of community social problems 
through traditional means shall be carried out by adat institutions” (LoGA, 2006).  
 
It is also somewhat unclear how the adat-leaders are elected, but they are regulated on 
the district level and are the responsibility of the vice-regent.  The adat institutions are 
also sub-ordinate to the Wali Nanggroe institution (LoGA, 2006), which was 
introduced in the special autonomy law from 2001 and is:   
 
“A non-structured organization in its administration and a symbol of the preservation 
of (Acehnese) culture and tradition rather than be involved in any political decision 
making” (Special autonomy law on Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) Law no. 18 of 
2001). 
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Thus, due to its apolitical character the Wali Nanggroe is chosen by a group of expert 
decision-makers that is separate from the government structure. Hence, a major 
dilemma in this case is that the adat institutions cannot be democratic even if the adat 
leaders are elected, as long as it is sub-ordinate to the undemocratic Wali Nanggroe 
institution. Regarding these adat institutions, there seems to be a general optimism 
about these in South Aceh, and they are seen as a major arena for potential citizen 
participation if they are further developed.  
In the research on access to justice the unclear relationship between areas 
controlled by the government and areas controlled by the adat institutions is further 
illustrated through a case study of a land dispute in a sub-district of South Aceh. The 
land dispute is about a land area that by the government is viewed as a part of the 
TNGL12 national park, while the villagers perceive the area as customary land. The 
decision to establish new borders took place without any consultation with the local 
population although the villagers have clearly documented history on village adat 
areas. This case is thus illustrative of a system where the relationship between 
traditional law and public law is somewhat blurred. Further the impression from the 
preliminary research findings is that the dispute settlement mechanisms does not 
include the villagers and there is no forum where they can bring up their aspirations 
(Avonius, 2010b). Further, around 70% of the forest in the South Aceh district is 
currently conservation land. The dispute can thus also be related to a more general 
conflict between conservation of land and livelihood of the local population.  
The researcher in South Aceh that looked into the education and the health 
sector found that the district government is not very active in regards to education and 
health, and there is a lack of district regulations. Also there is a distinction between the 
public schools that are under the domain of the education department, and the religious 
schools that are under the domain of the religious department (Avonius, 2010c).  
                                            
12 Taman Nasional Gunung Leuser is a national park of conservation areas in Indonesia.  
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In such a system of governance where the chains of responsibilities is unclear, 
people will have problems with knowing where to go with different issues, and 
continue to turn to influential individuals or contacts, and thus contribute to the 
sustainment of undemocratic practices. Another implication of the fragmentation of 
governance is that it is more difficult for people to hold decision-makers accountable 
than in a system where mandates and responsibilities are clear.  
 
4.1.2 Intermediary Channels for Exercising Popular Control 
The Demos-study concluded that in the realm of participation through political 
parties, the poor or those with low education is largely excluded because candidates 
for elections are required to have a certain degree of education and it is also impossible 
to build a party from below without having large funds at hand (Törnquist, 2010a: 17). 
The election channel is thus functioning while the influencing, and establishment of 
these parties is restricted to a few people in society.  
Törnquist (2009b: 13) further argues that in Indonesia at large there is a 
shortage of institutionalized channels for interest and issue group participation beyond 
clientilism and good contacts. Popular organisations based on knowledge and special 
interest such as trade unions or environmental movements are in general lacking in 
Indonesia, and thus when pro-democrats do have a say it takes place primarily through 
lobbying, individual contacts or to some extent pressure groups (Törnquist, 2010a: 18), 
while groups of democrats rarely come together in organized politics (Törnquist, 
2010e: 4).  
A general problem in Indonesia is that the people are lacking democratic skills 
and experience because of decades with authoritarian rule. The separate issue- and 
interest-group representation that does exist is in general weak and undemocratic. 
Because of the lack of institutionalisation of the channels for participation a problem is 
that of people not learning what to expect from these, and as a consequence instead 
turn to the influential individuals or patrons which they do know what to expect from.  
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 In the Aceh province, as in Indonesia in general, these problems of 
representation have contributed to a tendency amongst important actors as well as the 
people to approach governance institutions either by approaching for instance 
politicians or bureaucrats directly, outside the democratic framework, or to go via 
supplementary agents such as the media, NGOs and patrons and fixers rather than the 
potentially more democratically representative institutions such as political parties and 
popular-oriented interest-based organizations. This shortage of institutionalized 
channels for interest and issue group participation, beyond clientilism and good 
contacts is a problem throughout Indonesia, and in Aceh a direct approach for 
representation is more significant than representation through mediators. This is also 
the case when people do turn to interest organisations or political parties. Instead of 
turning to the organization or political party as a whole, they bypass the democratic 
organizational framework and instead turn to individuals within these organizations 
(Törnquist, 2010b: 92).  
The preliminary findings from the research on the South Aceh district show that 
formal organising among workers for instance through trade unions is uncommon, and 
popular organisations representing various groups of actors are weak. In the health and 
education sector the arenas for participation appeared to be especially difficult to 
locate, and there seems to be a general lack of social movements that focus on health 
issues and education. The research on the area of production development indicates 
that ordinary people normally use traditional adat institutions when they are facing 
problems in this area. Formal associations such as farmers groups representing the 
landowners or the renters of the land do exist, but these associations are mostly used if 
there are possibilities for the attainment of government support or money. The farmers 
groups thus do not seem to make sense as a way of gaining influence for ordinary 
people, and it was indicated that the farmers groups were seen as a part of the elite. In 
the education and the health sector there are no social movements in South Aceh, and 
the main actors that have impact seem to be individuals in key positions such as school 
principals or directors of hospitals. In these sectors the findings from the research 
indicate that formal mechanisms for these actors to influence policy or approaching 
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government is lacking, so the initiatives becomes arbitrary and the result is a system 
consisting of liberal openings for individuals with good contacts and skills (Avonius, 
2010c).  
In the area of physical planning in South Aceh the researcher found that there 
exist several forums where people are enabled to participate, but observations and 
interviews suggested that people do not feel that these forums enable them to actually 
influence the decision-making. Three such forums for public participation in planning 
were explored with regards to popular participation. The Musrenbang13 is a national-
vide deliberative multi-stakeholder forum that aims to promote processes for 
negotiating, reconciling and harmonizing differences between government and 
nongovernmental stakeholders and reaching collective consensus on development 
priorities and budgets. It was launched by the Indonesian government as a part of the 
decentralization process that was initiated in 1999, and is the principal instrument for 
public consultation. It is divided in a hierarchy of forums that function on community 
level, sub district level and the district level. At each level the goal is to reach a 
consensus, and there is a selection of representatives that should attend the 
Musrenbang at a higher level (USAID, 2007). A report 2007 report from USAID on 
the general functioning of the Musrenbang identifies some general limitations with the 
forum as an arena for participation. These limitations include uneven commitment 
from the regional leaders, limited transparency and information of budgeting by the 
regional governments leading to a lack of oversight and meaningful involvement of 
other stakeholders. Further the capacity of Civil Society Organizations to understand 
the planning process is limited and a general complexity of the issues that results in 
difficulties for actors to be involved in decision-making (USAID, 2007).  
The PNPM (The National Program of Community Empowerment14) is a 
national project supported by the World Bank. President Yudhoyono launched the 
PNPM project in August 2006 as a policy and operational umbrella for all community 
empowerment in Indonesia, based on earlier programs such as the Kecamatan 
                                            
13 Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan 
14 Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat. 
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Development Program (KDP) and the Urban Poverty Project (UPP), and the program 
is now covering all villages and cities in the country. The PNPMs aim is to reduce 
poverty and improve local governance by providing resources to support productive 
development by communities. People are empowered to participate through a 
participatory planning process and through village meetings where proposals are 
offered and up to three are decided on. Further a delegation is selected for attending 
the district level meetings (Blair, 2010: 14).    
 
“The overall PNPM objectives are being achieved through: (a) communities 
participating in an open planning process; (b) the provision of grants to communities 
directly and transparently to finance an open “menu” of poverty-alleviation activities; 
and (c) enhancing the capacity of central and local governments to partner with 
community organizations in the provision of services” (WorldBank, 2010b). 
 
Because the PNPM is funded by the World Bank, there is a concern about what will 
happen to the program when the World Bank withdraws its support, and the 
responsibility is left to the government (Avonius, 2010b).  
In addition to the existence of the Musrenbang forum and the PNPM, the Aceh 
Province also has its own community development program. The BKPG15 (Financial 
Assistance for Village Prosperity Program) is a program conveyed by the Aceh 
Governor Irwandi Yusuf on 13 July 2008, where the aim is to improve Aceh people’s 
welfare through community development and empowerment. The fund provided is 100 
million Rupiah16 for each village, and it is used through an independent planning 
process by the communities, and the district government is obliged to provide co-
funding for this program minimally at 50 million Rupiah per village (WorldBank, 
2010a).  The major focus of the BKPG has been on development of infrastructure. The 
province parliament has stated that they will not provide any more resources for the 
project so the future of the BKPG is somewhat insecure.  
                                            
15 Program Bantuan Keuangang Pemakmue Gampong 
16 100 mill Indonesian Rupiah = approximately 11.000 USD.  
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The general assessment based on the preliminary research results from the 
South Aceh district was that the BKPG is the preferred arena for peoples’ 
participation, and that the Musrenbang in comparison is considered to be 
manipulative. Because the Musrenbang institution functions on a range of levels from 
the village level to the provincial level, a problem is that the people’s suggestions are 
often lost somewhere before the implementation. The general assessment is that for 
ordinary people the Musrenbang is not responsive to their suggestions, so even though 
the space for participation formally is in place it does not work in practice. According 
to the research-team the BKPG appears to be a more successful arena for participation 
by the people in the sense that people feel that there is an opening for actually 
influencing the decision-making. This seems to be to a large extent because it provides 
and arena where it is possible to participate outside of the embedded power structures, 
and ordinary people can actually participate without having to go through powerful 
individuals.  Still the somewhat unsecure future of the PNPM and the BKPG is an 
example of that even though such arenas do exist, they are usually initiated in relation 
to specific government programs, and therefore normally they will cease to function at 
the end of such programs. 
When these formal arenas for participation, do not make sense to ordinary 
people, the consequence is that instead, individual initiatives are often taken trough 
contacts, and problems with nepotism, patronage and exclusive access remains 
common. The same problem is present in the education sector, where the key actors in 
South Aceh for influencing policy are the principals. The impression is that the 
principals have difficulties obtaining support from above, and the tendency is a 
fragmented system where influential individuals with good contacts and skills are 
favoured.  
In conclusion, many of the problems identified in South Aceh seem to be 
related to people not having democratic channels to act through for gaining 
representation for their interests. Influential individuals often capture the open spaces 
for participation that does exist, additional representation is arbitrary, and there is a 
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feeling among people that they are not able to gain any influence. Further most people 
do not have the capacity to develop new channels for interest representation.   
 
4.1.3 Capacity of and Trust in Government Institutions  
This section will address some of the problems in Aceh that can be seen in 
relation to firstly some weaknesses with the capacity of the government, referring to 
the both the input and the output side of democracy. Further, and this is of course 
connected to and partly an outcome of the first point, a lot of the problems can be seen 
in relation to a general lack of trust in these government institutions.   
A major reason for why people in Indonesia lack trust in the state is that 
corruption is widespread, and there is a general tendency of ‘wrong people in wrong 
places’. People are hired through friends and family and a lot of people working in the 
public administration are not qualified reference. Indonesia has a well-deserved 
reputation for being corrupt (Hadiz, 2010: 36).  One can claim that in Indonesia in 
general there is a distinction between the formal state that consists of formal 
bureaucratic institutions, and the co-existence of a shadow state in which business 
men, bureaucrats, politicians and criminals interact on a regular basis (Nordholt, 2004: 
33). Officials in the public administration uses their positions to further their own 
interests rather than those of the citizens (Antlöv & Wetterberg, 2010: 5), so the public 
administration is not necessarily subordinated to elected politicians and public law.  
The most common complaint among newly elected representatives in Aceh is, 
according to the Demos-study, the weak and unreliable administration, and the 
relevant indicators in the survey was depressing regarding transparency and 
accountability of the public administration (Törnquist, 2009c: 21). The analysis based 
on the results from the Demos study also indicated that businessmen in Aceh were 
closely related to politicians and administrators. Earlier research on Aceh also points 
out that targeted employment in the public sector is a problem because being hired in 
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the public administration is very attractive and there is a tendency to hire friends and 
relatives.  
Relating to the output-side of democracy this has to do with the implementation 
of democratic decisions by the public administration. A certain state capacity is 
necessary for assuring that the democratic decisions are actually implemented. If there 
is a democratic decision that is not properly implemented by the public administration, 
democracy is being severely undermined (Törnquist, 2010a: 32).  
 Aspinall (2009: 14) finds that earlier GAM actors have gained access to 
economic resources during the post-conflict phase by arranging to have GAM 
members and allies hired in various government agencies. Further, a lot of earlier 
GAM commanders have moved into business, especially in the construction industry, 
which is a very corrupt and politicized industry. Their chief activities involve building 
infrastructure (especially roads, bridges, and irrigation channels) or providing 
materials (sand, stones, and timber) for such work (Aspinall, 2009: 2). Throughout 
Indonesia, construction contracts are often awarded on the basis of political 
connections, and large proportions of contract costs are lost to corruption (Aspinall, 
2009: 2).  
Further there is a general problem in with what van Klinken (2009: 148) refers 
to as patronage democracy. Results from the Demos-study showed that the informants 
felt that most people identified themselves primarily in terms of their local ethnic 
community or, to a somewhat lesser extent, with their religious community, rather than 
with the Indonesian nation, and this tendency was especially strong in regions such as 
Papua and Aceh (van Klinken, 2009: 144). He further refers to a democratic deficit 
due to entrenched local inequalities, and local elites mainly identified as individuals 
associated with the state, that did not deliberately bypass the democratic framework, 
but manipulated the rules to suit their own interests. Still, this elite were not identified 
as being isolated from the population, but rather they had social and political roots, and 
exercised their influence through clientelistic practices or alternative patronage 
through private organisations (van Klinken, 2009: 144). These elite groups have 
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gained influence through their ability to win elections and are thus different from the 
New Order elite. A result is according to Törnquist (2010a: 16) that the interest in 
elections is both a crucial basis for democracy and a major drawback in the sense that 
democracy in Indonesia would not survive without this elite, while their existence is at 
the same time making democracy a domain of ‘rotten politicians’. Aspinall (2010: 22) 
also points out the manner in which Indonesian democracy has proven able to absorb, 
accommodate, and serve the interests of powerful elite groups, but he also argues that 
this absorptive capacity has in fact contributed greatly to the stability and 
achievements of the democratic transition.   
In Indonesia in general it is problematic that there has not developed a real 
alternative to the old authoritarian state. One reason for this is that the people who 
have been pro democracy have not wanted to ally with the people who have been pro a 
strong state because it is exactly the strong authoritarian state that has been viewed as 
a hindrance for democracy reference. There has been an extensive process of 
decentralization in Indonesia after the dismantling of the New Order regime, but it is 
questioned if this necessarily has led to more democracy and better governance. The 
decentralization process in Indonesia has led to what has been labelled changing 
continuities: ‘Less state’ does not automatically result in ‘more democracy’, and in 
order to develop democratic control and to guarantee the rule of law, there is in fact a 
need for a certain state capacity to overcome the persistence of old patrimonial 
patterns (Nordholt, 2004: 48).  
The conflict between the state level and the local level concerns how the 
different levels are governed by elites. In Indonesia the decentralization is being 
affected by the fact that there are strong elites on both the state and the regional levels 
that are fighting for power (Hadiz, 2010: 3). For instance, existing local elites may 
capture the new local government, and decentralization will thus not lead to more 
democracy or equal representation. 
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In South Aceh there seems to be a general view that less state actually leads to 
more democracy17. This view that the state should be as little involved as possible can 
probably be related to the historical development of an Acehnese identity based on 
rebellion and resistance against outside involvement, together with the view that Aceh 
is special. Because of its special region status Aceh also has more autonomy than other 
Indonesian provinces, for instance through the re-introduction of the customary adat 
institutions and the Wali Nanggroe as a symbol of the preservation of the Acehnese 
culture and tradition. The preference of a lot of people for the adat institutions as an 
arena for people’s participation can also be interpreted as a way of opposing the state 
and instead embrace the institutions that are based in the local community, even 
though these are not necessarily democratic.  
 
“The weak and not trusted public governance has given way to ‘community’ 
governance which may benefit some, but not all, and only work locally and in certain 
sectors” (Törnquist, 2010e: 11). 
 
Further, the research from South Aceh also found that a major problem is that the 
people working in government agencies are not qualified, and there is a lack of formal 
procedures and regulations for how people are being hired. According to the research 
on production development people often receive positions due to family relations 
(Avonius, 2010c). Further, 70% of the budget in the South Aceh district is spent on 
civil servants wages, which in turn have led to a major problem with limited budget 
funds.   
 
 
 
                                            
17 This claim is based on a general impression from the field trip in South Aceh and on conversations with the 
researchers.  
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4.2 Linking the Findings to Democratic Representation  
The point of departure for the discussion is as outlined in the theoretical 
framework Beethams (1999: 33) definition of the aim of democracy as popular control 
over public affairs on the basis of political equality, and three basic pillars are 
distinguished: The people, the public matters and the intermediary ways to exercise 
popular control of policymaking and implementation (Törnquist, 2009d: 10).  
In short, research on the state of democracy in Indonesia indicates that the 
fundamental problem of democracy in Indonesia is that of weak popular representation 
(Törnquist, 2010a: 18). The researchers in South Aceh has aimed to map what actually 
exists of popular representation, and the conclusion so far is that the popular 
representation is limited and that this in turn is related to problems with a 
fragmentation of the demos and the public affairs, a lack of institutionalized channels 
for interest representation and participation and government institutions with weak 
capacity that are not trusted. The problems identified above are obviously connected 
and dependent on each other. These three overarching problems can in turn all be 
related to a need to further develop democracy beyond the holding of elections only.  
Why are the findings from Aceh problematic in regards to the definition of 
democracy? The most problematic issue in Aceh seems to be related to the 
intermediary ways people have to exercise control of policymaking and the 
implementation.  As of today the people in Aceh has only one major arena for 
obtaining popular control over public affairs on the basis of political equality, namely 
through elections. Even the elective channel can also be questioned if the people end 
up not having any party that represents their interest that they can vote for. The 
supplementary forms of popular control are for the most part not based on political 
equality in the sense that either the channels does not exist, or individual lobbying and 
patronage is still dominant. The somewhat unclear division of responsibility between 
the adat institutions and the government indicates that it is not unambiguous what are 
the public affairs that should be subject to popular control. Further there is a problem 
that relations between the state and the people are mediated by on one hand market 
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institutions and on the other hand communal groups or civil associations where non of 
these mediators are subject to democratic control and thus not accountable to the 
people (Törnquist, 2010a: 18). 
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5 Democratic Representation in Scandinavia  
 
5.1 Does a Comparison with Scandinavia Make Sense?  
By taking the main problems with representation in Aceh as a point of departure 
for reading into Scandinavian experiences, this opens up for a focused thematic 
analysis. Research on Indonesia and Aceh in general and the recent findings from 
South Aceh have illustrated that even though the challenges are many and wide-
ranging, many of the issues are in fact related to popular representation and 
participation in governance (Törnquist, 2010e: 11). The questions that could be asked 
when reading into Scandinavian experiences are thus what processes and which 
specific turning points were essential historically for avoiding a fragmentation of the 
demos and the public affairs, for the developing of institutionalized additional 
representation beyond elections, and for developing a strong and trusted state. The idea 
is to identify the important turning points for this historical development in 
Scandinavia, and then more specifically trace the processes that led to the reaching of 
these decisive moments.  
Because the two contexts of Aceh and Scandinavia are indeed different in almost 
every aspect, the aim is not to find out how this developed in Scandinavia and then try 
to copy this in Aceh. The idea is rather to take these problems as a point of departure 
for looking into how some of these problems have either been at least partially solved 
or avoided historically in Scandinavia, and then try to identify the processes that 
explain this positive outcome. If one can identify these decisive factors and trace how 
they came about one could possibly be one step closer to the deepening of democracy 
in a context such as Aceh. 
By narrowing down the comparison to thematic fields more contextual analysis 
is possible (Törnquist, 2010e: 2). Further, by focusing on processes in contrast to 
identifying necessary structural preconditions, it is possible to identify what 
developments were the results of actual policy and political or actor-based decisions 
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rather than unique structural factors. This in turn allows for a comparison of any 
similar processes or actors can be identified in the otherwise different contexts. Of 
course the exact same processes will not be possible to recreate in Aceh because the 
actors and structures are not the same, but the aim is to see if it is some similar 
processes or actors that were important in Scandinavia can be identified in Aceh.   
 
5.2 Mapping the Situation in Scandinavia  
What is the situation in Scandinavia compared to Aceh on the actual existence of 
popular representation? In the following section the focus will be on mapping general 
tendencies in Scandinavia regarding the problems that were found to be essential in 
Aceh. The same categories will be used as in the discussion on the situation in Aceh, 
and the focus will be on the crucial issues that were identified. A main question to be 
answered is thus what possibilities exist for people in Scandinavia to achieve 
(democratic) representation, and how is this related to the definition of the demos and 
the public affairs, the intermediary channels for exercising popular control and the 
capacity of and trust in government institutions?  
 
5.2.1 Relationship Between the Demos and the Public Affairs   
In Scandinavia in general, the definition of the demos have traditionally been 
taken for granted. The question about who should be consulted in the decisions about 
different aspects of the public affairs can be subject to law, or it could be something 
that is not subject to law but is negotiated on. In Scandinavia this has not necessarily 
been subject to specific laws but still there has been a tradition for corporatist systems 
with mechanisms for the inclusion of interest organizations. This system for the 
inclusion of interest organizations and stakeholders in Scandinavia has been labelled 
societal corporatism, and its main characteristic is that the negotiations between the 
state and the interest organizations are formalized and institutionalized. This model 
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thus stands in contrast to state-corporatism where the state has virtually all control, and 
pluralism, which is recognized by looser contacts and lobbyism which gives the 
organizations less binding responsibilities (Nordby, 2004: 99; Rothstein & Trägårdh, 
2007: 235).  
This institutionalized relationship have enabled the state and the associations to 
confront new challenges and work out compromised solutions in a peaceful and 
cooperative manner (Rothstein & Trägårdh, 2007: 236). Moreover, the fact that the 
system was institutionalized contributed to actors knowing how the processes worked 
and what to expect, thus lowering the barriers for participation. Thus, in Scandinavia 
there was and to a large extent still is an institutionalized system for inclusion of the 
affected parties in decisions about public affairs. About the Swedish state in particular 
it has been argued that rather than acting as a powerful enforcer serving its own 
interest, the state serves more as a number of institutional spaces in which 
representatives from society meet to work out policies in a spirit of consensus and 
compromise (Rothstein & Trägårdh, 2007: 235).   
In Norway, the Public Administration Act from 1967 also legally gives those 
affected by a case the right to be notified before decisions are made, the right to access 
documents relating to the case, and to complain about individual decisions to a 
superior public administrative body. As a general rule these documents should also be 
available for the parts that are not involved in a case such as the media (Christensen, et 
al., 2007: 64). Further, it is also a common practice in both Norway and Sweden of 
appointing governmental commissions for aiding in the preparation of new laws, or 
developing new policies. These commissions are usually composed of people 
representing political parties and the organizations having a special interest or 
competence in the particular subject matter (Trägårdh, 2007a: 260-261).  
Another reason for the relatively clear definition of the public affairs in 
Scandinavia is the extensive universalistic welfare state. Esping-Andersen (1990: 3) 
distinguishes between three general types of welfare state regimes. These three are 
different in their logic of organization, stratification and societal integration, and have 
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origins in different historical forces and follow different developmental trajectories. 
The liberal welfare state is characterized by means-tested assistance, modest universal 
transfers or modest social insurance plans. It is based on traditional, liberal work-ethic 
norms, and entitlements are strict and often associated with stigma. Typical examples 
of this welfare regime are found in the United States, Canada and Australia. The 
corporatist or Christian democratic welfare state is conservative and rights are 
normally attached to class and social status. The church is an important actor, and 
traditional family-hood is viewed as important. Social insurance is normally based on 
the family as a unit and not on individuals, so it typically excludes non-working wives 
and services such as day-care is underdeveloped. In this type of welfare state the 
provision of welfare is not left to the market, but the welfare state has not 
redistributive effects. Examples of this welfare state regime are found in Austria, 
France, Germany and Italy (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26-28).  
The social democratic or Scandinavian welfare regime then is characterized by 
universalism, and aims at being a welfare state that promotes an equality of the highest 
standards instead of an equality of minimal needs. The manual workers enjoy rights 
identical to white-collar employees or civil servants, with a universal insurance system 
where benefits are graduated according to accustomed earnings. The welfare state 
takes responsibility for task that has traditionally been taken care of by the family such 
as day-care and caring for the aged, something that enables women to choose more 
freely. Full employment is an important part of the welfare states commitment 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26-28).  
The universality and the fact that the welfare states in Scandinavia are so 
encompassing, means that as compared to more liberal systems, most aspects of 
peoples life are viewed as part of the public affairs, and thus something that the state 
should take responsibility for.  This is further illustrated by the fact that the words for 
“state” and “society” have been used as synonyms in Scandinavia, even though this 
might have changed with the introduction of the concept of ‘civil society’ (Trägårdh, 
2007b: 3). The recent banking crisis has illustrated the attitude that also the economy 
and market is the responsibility of the government.    
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5.2.2 Intermediary Channels for Exercising Popular Control 
The Scandinavian countries in general score very high on international surveys 
on participation in organizations, and representation through trade unions and formal 
organizing among workers has been particularly strong in Scandinavia. 49% of the 
participants in the Norwegian citizenship study18 from 2001 stated that they were 
members of a trade union or an employee organization. Further, 17 % of the 
respondents said that they were members of an organization or association where they 
could discuss, or take other measures against unreasonable decisions made by the 
municipal board or the Parliament. 28 % of the respondents stated that they during the 
last twelve months have contacted an organization or association to try to improve or 
counteract decay in society (Strømsnes, 2003: 89, 92). 
The political parties in Scandinavia have traditionally taken the form of mass 
organisations with extensive membership, thus including ordinary citizens. Hence, 
there has not been the same degree of elite-capture in Scandinavia as is common in 
many developing countries, but a recent tendency in both Sweden and Norway is that 
in general the participation and activity through political parties have declined, and 
people are instead more active through demonstrations, contact with decision-makers, 
the media and other ways of affecting policy (Østerud, et al., 2003: 79). The most 
common intermediary channels for representation in Scandinavia are thus through that 
of political society or civil society, which is also closely linked to the state institutions, 
while representation through informal leaders is uncommon. 
Further, much of the representation takes place through the democratic 
framework where the government is accountable through transparent and responsive 
institutions, including mechanisms for people to complain if they are not satisfied.   
                                            
18 Citizenship in this study does not refer to the legal definition of the term, but to the sociological definition 
(Strømsnes, 2003).  The Norwegian citizenship study is from 2001 and is a survey based on a selection of 5000 
persons in the age 18 to 84 years. The selection was drawn first by stratification by county, and next by random 
selection in each strata (Strømsnes, 2003: 37). 
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5.2.3 Capacity of and Trust in Government Institutions  
According to Lars Trägårdh (2007b: 1) the Swedish political tradition is marked 
by a paradox between on the one hand the strong centralist state and on the other hand 
the open democratic society where citizens enjoy easy access to political leaders and 
political processes. Sweden scores comparatively high on both measures of trust, 
social capital and membership in voluntary organizations and on the involvement of 
the state and high taxes and public spending (Trägårdh, 2007b: 3).  
In Scandinavia in general, trust in the state institutions is very high. The 
bureaucracies have a strong position, and there are specified and transparent 
procedures for employment of civil servants. According to the Norwegian Civil 
Service Act positions in the public administration should be publicly announced, and 
there are specified procedures for employment of the positions (Christensen, et al., 
2007: 73). Concerning the people that are employed in the public administration this is 
related to the degree of meritocracy in society, and how this has historically been 
defended in Scandinavia. There also exist procedures for evaluations and a chain of 
responsibility with a clear division of responsibility. Politicians have to follow up on 
the implementation as well and not just on the decision making process, and there are 
independent bodies whose task is to control government activities. There is also a 
strong tradition for documents being made public and transparency in the public 
sector.  
The public administrations capacity to implement policy impartially has to do 
with state capacity. An important factor in Scandinavia is that there is a relatively 
strong state with resources and capacity. There are similarities between Norway and 
Sweden when it comes to the separation of power between the centre and the 
periphery. Even though the Scandinavian states are associated with strong states, 
Sellers and Lindström (2007: 610) finds that the distinctive infrastructure of local 
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government that accompanies the social democratic welfare state is in crucial respects 
among the most decentralized in the advanced industrial world.  
There are two main reasons why the egalitarian universalistic welfare states are 
dependent on strong local governments: First of all a strong local government is 
necessary to carry out the welfare state policy. Secondly a strong local government can 
be an important link between national government and local civil society organizations 
(Sellers & Lidström, 2007: 610-611). 
 
5.2.4 Recent Developments: Towards Fragmentation of Democracy? 
 
“The parliamentary chain of government is weakened in every link; parties and 
elections are less mobilizing; minority governments imply that the connection 
between election results and policy formation is broken; and elected assemblies have 
been suffering a notable loss of domain” (Østerud & Selle, 2006: 25) 
 
The most recent Norwegian Power and democracy study19 (Østerud, et al., 2003: 295) 
conclude that democracy is being weakened. The parliamentary chain of governance is 
being weakened: The elective channel is being reduced, while other channels for 
participation and influence is being widened. Among the important challenges to the 
democracy in Scandinavia are globalization and Europeanization that has led to a 
development where the chains of responsibilities and the definition of public affairs 
have become less clear. Nordby (2004: 107) finds that the corporatist structures in the 
Scandinavian countries are no longer as dominating as earlier, and elements of 
pluralism are gaining more influence. This general development may thus not be 
entirely different from that of polycentrism that has been identified to be problematic 
in Aceh.   
                                            
19 These findings are based on the Norwegian power and democracy study, but the tendencies are the same in 
Sweden.  
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 Further, the Scandinavian populations are becoming more pluralistic as a result 
of the globalisation and the massive immigration. This means that the definition of the 
demos that earlier have been taken for granted, are becoming a challenge in the 
Scandinavian countries. Further, the immigration and globalisation also have lead to a 
more pluralistic society concerning religion, and there is an increasing debate around 
the relationship between religious customs and public law.  
 The weakening of the parliamentary chain of governance through the decrease 
in people using the electoral channel, while additional channels for participation is 
being widened, could also be seen in relationship with the findings from Aceh where 
people prefer to go outside of the traditional channels such as political parties. The 
main challenge with this development is that these additional channels are not 
necessarily subjected to any democratic control.   
  Thus, a tendency is that some vital elements of the Scandinavian model have 
been weakened. Hence, if these elements of the Scandinavian democracy should be 
sustained, investigating what historical processes were essential in this development is 
also necessary for the investigation of why democracy is being weakened.  
 
5.2.5 Summing Up the Main Points  
Many of the problems that was found to be essential in Aceh in relation to the 
further development of popular representation seems to be functioning quite well in 
Scandinavia. Still, recent developments reveal a tendency where some of these factors 
are being weakened in Scandinavia. Based on the previous outline of the situation in 
Scandinavia, there are some essential developments that need to be further 
investigated.  
Concerning the relatively clear definition of the public affairs, the aspects that 
should be further looked into, is the development of the social corporatist system and 
the universal and extensive welfare state, in contrast to for instance state corporatism 
or a Christian democratic welfare state. Regarding the definition of the demos this has 
59 
 
not been subject to dispute historically but is an emerging problem that should be 
further looked into, but in another context.   
Concerning the intermediary channels for participation, what is essential is to 
identify the processes that can explain the development of the extensive participation 
in political parties and organizations such as trade unions. One could also question 
why there does not seem to have been a major problem in Scandinavia with 
representation through informal leaders.  
Regarding the issue concerning state capacity and trust in government 
institutions, the questions that are essential to investigate further are how come people 
in Scandinavia have developed such high levels of trust in the state? Further, how did 
there develop a system where transparency of public administration, and procedures 
for employment were essential. And lastly, how could the strong local governments be 
combined with a strong state?   
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6 Tracing the Development in Scandinavia  
 
6.1 The General Situation Before the Democratization 
When looking into the historical developments of these issues that might explain 
the somewhat ‘positive’ outcomes regarding popular representation, it is first 
necessary to identify some of the important actors and structures in Scandinavia before 
the development of democracy.  
First of all, the conditions in Scandinavia were not as different from the post-
colonial countries as the core of the western countries was (Törnquist, 2010e: 4).  The 
Scandinavian countries were relatively poor, and in the mid-nineteenth century 
Norway and Sweden were underdeveloped nations of peasants and fishermen in 
particular (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 41). Further there was also high economic 
inequality (Moene & Wallerstein, 2003: 5) 
In Norway this relative poverty, together with the relative strength of the farmers 
as compared to other classes, contributed to the fact that there did not develop a strong 
upper class, and Norway was comparatively more egalitarian than Sweden in the 
nineteenth century. For instance had Norway from 1814 a one-chamber system, and 
the abolishment of the aristocracy in Norway only concerned a few individuals 
(Kjeldstadli, 2007: 2) while in Sweden the upper house was not abolished until 1918 
(Danielsen, 1995: 313). Still, even though Sweden had nobility, the relative poverty of 
the state as well as the peasants’ abilities to obtain independence through alliances 
with the king, the aristocracy in Sweden had been severely weakened in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 48). 
Universal male suffrage was established as late as in 1917 in Sweden, with 
general suffrage following four years later. Another difference between Norway and 
Sweden in this period is thus the relatively later introduction of universal suffrage in 
Sweden than in Norway, and the later organizing of the national political parties and 
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introduction of parliamentary government (Danielsen, 1995: 313). The 
industrialisation also came comparatively late in comparison with the rest of Europe. 
This meant that the extension of the right to vote and the parliamentarism came 
comparatively early in the industrialisation process. 
Norwegian peasants was comparatively independent, they were legally free, 
something which could possibly be explained by the difficulties of controlling such a 
scattered population (Kjeldstadli, 2007: 2), and in the period from 1660 the peasants 
worked their way towards becoming a freeholder that owned the means of production 
(Danielsen, 1995: 163). The relationship in Norway between the population in general 
and the urban elite was not dominated by the purchase of labour, but of trade, and the 
relationship was further characterized by a lack of the feudal exploitation common in 
the rest of Europe (Danielsen, 1995: 171). In Norway the otherwise free peasants and 
the middle classes were fundamental in the building of the independent state and 
democracy after Danish and Swedish dominance.  
 
6.1.1 How did the Social Corporatist System Develop?  
In Sweden, in particular but also to a certain extent in Norway, the corporate 
system had long historical roots back to the guild system. These corporatist institutions 
in Sweden were first established on the local level with corporative organized public 
labour exchanges (Rothstein & Trägårdh, 2007: 238). In Sweden the pre-democratic 
state opened up for inclusion of interests such as the labour movement and on the 
central level there was organized almost weekly meetings between state officials and 
representatives from the workers organizations (Rothstein & Trägårdh, 2007: 248).  
The fact that the farmers in Scandinavia had a relatively autonomous position in 
society resulted in that they to a large extent had their own organisations. Because the 
Scandinavian states in the nineteenth century was characterized as less repressive and 
lacking important feudal heritage, compared to continental Europe, the state was thus 
more open to popular demands and this manifested itself through independent political 
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representation of peasants in the parliament (Rothstein & Trägårdh, 2007: 234-235).  
There were neither a strong repressing elite, and in the struggle for democratisation, it 
developed a pact between farmers, landowners, workers and the liberals. 
State institutions like the parliament and government have played an important 
role in setting policy, and so has processes such as elections, but the role of the 
deliberative and inclusive democratic processes that occurred outside of these contexts 
is emphasized as being equally important for the development of the corporatism in 
Scandinavia. By arranging an arena for trustful and close cooperation between the 
state and various social and organized movements through commissions, committees 
and meetings with civil society organizations, a pattern was established and this in turn 
spilled over to other areas such as agriculture, temperance questions and relationship 
between the state and the organization of small companies (Rothstein & Trägårdh, 
2007: 250).  
Formal democracy was established comparatively late in Sweden and it followed 
after a struggle between the labour movement and other popular movements such as 
the temperance movement and the free churches, and the traditional elites on the other 
side. Thus the state was not strong enough to not have to make compromises and 
alliances during the democratization.  
Further, Rothstein and Trägårdh (2007: 231) argue that the Swedish case of 
extensive collaboration between the state and voluntary associations, can be explained 
by the specific structure of the pre-democratic Swedish state that was centralised but 
not closed, bureaucratic and professional but not especially authoritarian and 
differentiated but not without central coordination of policy. In Norway a range of 
voluntary organizations was established from the mid-nineteenth century. These grew 
out of broad-based social movements in civil society and normally addressed a 
particular welfare issue, such as the Red Cross. Because of the absence of a rich and 
beneficent bourgeoisie and the relative subordination of the churches, these 
organizations did not have enough funding to become an alternative to public 
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responsibility for social welfare (Halvorsen & Stjernø, 2008: 11). Instead of becoming 
an alternative to the state, these organizations became closely linked to it.   
This contributed to the development of a mutual trust and the close cooperation 
between state institutions and the civil society associations (Rothstein & Trägårdh, 
2007: 231). In the interwar period the belief in the free marked and capitalism was 
replaced by a view that the regulation and planning from the state was necessary 
(Danielsen, 1995: 314). The involvement and active role of the state also meant that 
interest could have an incentive to organize to affect the government policy. Because 
the state was involved it also had incentives to make the different interest groups and 
potential voters as satisfied as possible, and thus negotiate with them. The crisis 
management in Norway in the 1930s was based on close cooperation between the state 
and the industrial organizations (Danielsen, 1995: 330).  
 The main foundation for the ‘modern’ corporatism was thus developed in the 
1930s, but not perfected until after the second world war, when the social democratic 
party in Norway were able to mobilize consensus between all the parties around an 
economic program designed to rebuild the country after the war, and with the slogan 
of ‘work for everyone’ (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 216). In Sweden the situation was 
somewhat different due to the neutrality during the war, and there was not the same 
consensus between the political parties, but from the beginning of the 1950s the 
Swedish social democratic party also led a program of solidaristic wage bargaining, 
where the focus was on reducing income inequalities and establish universal welfare 
schemes. The logic behind these economic policies was a close cooperation between 
the state, the trade unions and the employer organisations that combined the employers 
demands for economic efficiency with the trade unions demands for equal rights for 
workers through collective wage agreements (Moene & Wallerstein, 2003: 9-10).  
This has in turn contributed to the fact that the Scandinavian countries are 
among the most egalitarian countries in the world (Moene & Wallerstein, 2003: 10). 
Because the employers organisations also was included in the negotiations through the 
corporative channel, and thus were able to influence the economic policy, a sort of 
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consensus was established where the bourgeois parties also have been supportive of 
large parts of the social democratic policy.   
 
6.1.2 Explaining the Development of the Universal Welfare State  
The development of the universal welfare state has to be seen in relation to the 
development of social democracy. The foundation of the development of Scandinavian 
social democracy can be traced back to the last part of the 19th century and the ideas of 
Eduard Bernstein.  After the orthodox Marxism had developed as a reaction against the 
social inequality and poverty the industrial revolution with the following introduction 
of capitalism had brought with it, it eventually became clear that Marxist predictions 
about the capitalisms self-destruction was not inevitable.  
Socialists in Scandinavia, and elsewhere, realised that to be able to reach their 
political goals, it was not enough to only sit and wait for capitalism to destroy itself, 
but there was a need for political action. Human action could of course be violent 
revolution as the Leninist view was. But within this group of socialists it also 
developed a so-called revisionist camp. The focus of these revisionists was that their 
political goals could be reached by making them attractive and desirable for the 
population, rather than force it through revolution. According to Bernstein, this could 
be done within the framework of democracy by actively work towards reformation of 
the existing system. This idea became the foundation for the social-democracy 
(Berman, 2006: 13-14). The social-democratic parties in Norway and Sweden were 
founded in respectively 1887 and 1889. These parties were then first and foremost 
closely related to an urban working-class and the already existing trade unions. In 
Scandinavia the development of the social democratic parties took place at the same 
time as the democratisation, with the development of parliamentarism and the 
extension of the right to vote (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 73-83) 
The first years of their existence, the social democratic parties obtained 
relatively little support, but proceeding from 1905 the support grew steadily in both 
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Norway and Sweden. In 1914 and 1915 in Sweden and Norway the social democratic 
parties gained respectively 36% and 32% of the votes. This growth can to a large 
extent be explained due to the development of universal suffrage and the mobilisation 
of the voters. Still, the social democrats could not get a majority in the parliament, and 
the years leading up to the 1930s were characterised by shifting minority governments. 
The social democratic parties had yet to develop a clearly formulated political 
platform, and the Norwegian social democrats experimented with a more revolutionary 
platform and was member of the communist international (Comintern) between 1919-
23 (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 73-83). 
 
However, around 1930 the Scandinavian countries, as well as the rest of Europe 
and the west, were affected by the economic recession. This recession contributed to 
the social democratic parties becoming the dominant parties in the Scandinavian 
countries. Berman (1998: 381) points out that an important reason for this 
development was that because of the economic recession it became important to put an 
ending to the political instability of the minority governments. To do this it was 
necessary to establish a majority coalition. Berman’s focus is on the Swedish example, 
but a similar process took place in Norway as well.  
The common denominator for the social democratic parties in this period was 
that they went from approaching the working class exclusively, to approaching the 
population as a whole with their political strategy. As Esping-Andersen (1985: 77) 
emphasises, the party rhetoric were changed from being about socialism to democracy, 
and instead of appealing to the working class they now appealed to the people. In 
Sweden this mode of thinking was central in the party throughout the interwar period, 
and the idea about the peoples home (folkhemmet) was emphasised (Berman, 1998: 
384). The politics of the social democratic parties was a politic of universality where 
the welfare should reach all people and not solely the working class. Both in Norway 
and Sweden the social democratic parties from the 1930s followed convergent politics 
based on similar alliances with the peasantry, that permitted Keynesian full-
employment policies combined with negotiations towards comparatively equal wages 
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(preventing imbalances and supporting modernisation of the economy) and social 
reform (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 88).  
The extensive welfare states in Scandinavia are thus to a large extent a result of 
the social democratic parties strategy and politics. But still the concept of universalism 
is not solely a result of the social democratic ideology but also the result of the fact 
that the social democrats had to make compromises with the political representatives 
of different social classes to be able to form government (Halvorsen & Stjernø, 2008: 
16). No party or interests has been strong enough by itself to obtain power and because 
of this there was a development where different actors realized that to get things done 
they had to cooperate and make compromises and alliances. In Scandinavia the interest 
organizations has also been forced to participate in a public discussion to achieve 
impact. Special interests could not achieve any impact only based on their special 
interest, but they saw the need to argue on a universal ground. 
An additional explanation for the universality of the welfare state is thus the fact 
that the social democrats had to build alliances with, and promote policy for farmers 
and other groups in society to win elections and to form government, and also that the 
different interests organizations has been included in decision-making through the 
corporatist system 
 
6.1.3 Explaining the Extensive Participation in Organizations  
One explanation for the extensive participation in organizations and trade unions 
is that the Scandinavian countries also chose an electoral system with proportional 
representation, something that meant that it would pay off to maximise the voter 
turnout for the political parties. The political parties was thus to a large extent mass-
parties based on membership. This was especially true for the social democratic parties 
who allied with the trade unions, and for a long period of time the membership in the 
party and the trade union was common.  
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An important explanatory factor for the high participation rate in organizations in 
Scandinavia is thus the strategy of the social democratic party with its close 
cooperation with trade unions and the creation of local party branches and the focus on 
local activities such as sports-associations through the party organisations. This led to 
the inclusion of a lot of people and people got organizational experience that 
functioned as a learning process and enabled them to participate in and develop new 
channels for interest representation.  
The abolition of economic privileges for the elite in Norway in the mid 
nineteenth century paved the way for new constellations of interests and a widespread 
creation of associations. These organizations had an important effect in the sense that 
they established conditions for unified action across the traditional boundaries based 
on function, locality and region (Danielsen, 1995: 265). Another important effect of 
these organizations was the training they gave people in taking part in political 
activities and being a part of public life, because many of the matters these 
organizations fought for could only be resolved through political means (Danielsen, 
1995: 265). The earlier existing ‘vacuum’ of possibilities for the opposition to channel 
its interests also was being filled in the period of the 1870s by in addition to the 
forming of organizations, the development of a range of newspapers and the holding of 
political rallies (Danielsen, 1995: 265). ).   
Early strong social or popular movements in Scandinavia can be exemplified for 
instance through the Christian lay movement with their focus on temperance 
(Kjeldstadli, 2007: 7). In Norway, the Thrane movement was the first organized 
popular movement in Norway and it represents one of the most remarkable outbreaks 
of popular protest in Norwegian history (Danielsen, 1995: 256). The aim of the 
movement was on the one hand a demand for one man, one vote, and on the other 
hand it also believed that the king should act personally to protect the interest of the 
common man. The movement embraced at the beginning workers, day laborers and 
craft workers, and spread to also include crofters, landless agricultural laborers and 
petty peasantry, and could in some places be viewed as a revolt of the entire primary 
sector against the bureaucracy and the capitalism (Danielsen, 1995: 256).  
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6.1.4 How come Scandinavians have so Much Trust in the State? 
In contrast to Putnam’s argument about social trust being created through 
participation in civil society, Rothstein (2004a: 114) suggests that general trust is in 
fact created through the existence of impartial government institutions. The argument 
is thus that the causal link between the state and trust does not go from civil society to 
state institutions, but instead that certain state institutions produces individuals and 
organizations with high social trust (Rothstein, 2004b: 16). This means that the high 
trust found in the Scandinavian countries actually could be interpreted as a result of the 
universal welfare state and the independent public administration.  
Trägårdh (2007a: 260-261) further suggests that a key to understanding the 
strength of social capital and trust in the state, is the sense of participation and having 
a stake that is promoted by involving the institutions of civil society, and thus the 
citizens, in the making of law and policy.  Hence, the argument that is posed is that 
public policy will have greater legitimacy when it is at least partly designed and 
deliberated upon with input from below and people are involved in other ways than 
only by electing politicians. He emphasizes the role of government commissions 
where representatives from political parties as well as from the organizations deemed 
to have special interests are included. Another important aspect is that drafts of new 
policies and laws are sent out to involved stakeholders so that they can comment or 
counter the proposals (Trägårdh, 2007a: 261). In this respect, the high levels of trust 
can also be explained by the existence of the social corporatist system where 
stakeholders are included in decision-making processes.  
  
6.1.5 Development of the Impartial Public Sector 
Concerning the public administration, the Swedish civil service was clearly in a 
state of decay at the dawn of the nineteenth century, characterized by purchasing of 
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posts, mismanaging and holding of multiple offices at the same time and use their 
positions for their personal interests (Rothstein, 2004b: 17). The public administration 
in Scandinavia has thus earlier faced similar problems to those identified in Aceh.  
Concerning the people that are employed in the public administration this is 
related to the degree of meritocracy in society, and how this has historically been 
defended in Scandinavia. From early on the jurist professionals dominated the public 
administration in Norway, and on a later point in history the social economists and the 
political scientists gained larger influence. Education has thus historically been the 
legitimate criterion for recruitment to positions in the public administration 
(Christensen, et al., 2007: 90). In Norway, from 1736 a law exam was required for 
legal officers, but positions in the public service were to a large extent based on 
heritage, family links or contacts (Danielsen, 1995: 181).  
The separation of powers and alliance system has led to a tradition for 
cooperation and openness. Because the state had to make compromises with other 
interests in the process of building a strong state during the democratization, these 
other interests also got access to the state and could demand more openness and 
transparency.  
Concerning the role of the public administration there is a difference between 
Norway where the politicians generally have more power over the bureaucracy, and 
Sweden where the bureaucracy normally is more powerful in implementing the 
political decisions according to laws and regulations. But in both cases there has been 
a strong tradition for that the bureaucrats should be able to act according to politically 
decided laws and regulations and not have to follow detailed interventions by the 
politicians.  
In 1814, when Norway formed a union with Sweden, the centralized and 
hierarchical state was established. From 1814-1884 the state system is referred to as 
the civil servant state because legally trained top administrative leaders dominated the 
state apparatus (Christensen, 2004: 25). ‘The fall of the public servant state’ should not 
be interpreted as meaning a reduction of the significance of the bureaucracy, but rather 
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it involved a development towards a role sharing between the political decision 
making institutions on the one hand and the bureaucracy on the other (Danielsen, 
1995: 269). Here there is a distinction between Norway where the politicians generally 
have more power over the bureaucracy, and Sweden where the bureaucracy normally 
is more powerful in implementing the political decisions according to laws and 
regulations.  
During the period between 1884 and 1940 there were a lot of changes in the 
structure of the public administration in Norway. Several new ministries were created 
and many of these were created on the basis of demands from interest groups and in 
the creation of the agricultural ministry business organizations were central 
(Christensen, et al., 2007: 31). This indicates that the public administration has been 
developed in accordance with, and been responsive to important interests in the 
society.  
 
6.1.6 How could Decentralization be Combined with a Strong State?  
Although formally Norway was in a union with Sweden and did not have its 
own representation abroad, the union was to a large extent more personal than based 
on comprehensive institutional arrangements (Danielsen, 1995: 219). In Norway the 
powerful tradition of management from the centre dated back to the union with 
Denmark (Danielsen, 1995: 259). The first development in Norway away from 
political life being preoccupied by an elite was the division of the Parliament into two 
parties, formalized with the creation of the parliamentary parties of the Liberals 
(Venstre) and the Conservatives (Høyre) in 1884 and resulting in the introduction of 
parlamentarism. This in turn paved the way for an extension of the franchise to also 
include men with an income above a certain limit (Danielsen, 1995: 263).  
 Decentralization can be viewed as a part of the process of building a strong 
state that is universal and not fragmented. The conclusion of Seller’s and Lindström’s 
study is that the strong local governments predated the social democratic welfare state 
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in Scandinavia and in fact is an important cause for its development. Swedish 
municipalities are based on the free farmers and their demands on local jurisdiction. In 
Norway local autonomy within the unitary state was already legally secured in 1837 
(Østerud, 2005: 706-707). In the process of making a strong state; for certain cases to 
be centralized, the state had to give something back to the municipalities. In Norway, 
the local government law of 1837 could be said to represent a compromise between a 
centralizing ideology manifested through the embetsmenn, and a wish for transfer of 
power to local bodies represented by the peasantry. The local authorities got 
jurisdiction to carry out certain tasks in areas such as education and poor relief, but 
still under control of the state, so that the local governments could be said to serve as 
the executive arms of the central government (Danielsen, 1995: 260). This could be 
related to Rose’s (2004: 180) argument that an important reason for the well 
functioning relations between the regional and state level in Scandinavia is that the 
local governments have not been viewed as a threat to the state, but as an active tool in 
the pursuit of national policy goals.  
 
6.2 Summing up the Main Points 
In the above section the aim has been to trace the development behind some of 
the issues that was found to be essential in explaining why issued found to be 
problematic in relation to the popular representation in Aceh, seems to be functioning 
quite well in Scandinavia. The tracing of the developments in this thesis are based on 
some of the major tendencies, but more extensive research should be performed with 
the aim of investigating these processes more thoroughly.  
When looking into the development of the social corporatism, many of the 
important factors were actually historical structures. There were important historical 
roots back to the guild system, and the further development of cooperation between 
state and organizations are explained by structural factors such as the strength of the 
state, the social positions of different groups in society and the relative weakness of 
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the churches.  Still, when looking at the more recent development of the corporatism in 
Scandinavia, this is not the case. The political decision about the need for state 
involvement in regulating the market and labour seems to be the most important for 
explaining the institutionalized system of consultation between the state and 
organizations. The early developments and foundations for social corporatism thus has 
to be viewed in terms of structural preconditions, while the institutionalization of the 
system at a later point in time was primarily due to political decisions.  
Regarding the development of the universal welfare state is closely linked to the 
policies of the Social Democratic Party, and the specific strategy of appealing to the 
‘people’ as a whole instead of only appealing to the workers. In the process of 
developing a universal welfare state actual political decisions seems to have played an 
essential role. The political role of the Social Democratic Parties can be said to have 
contributed to the extensive participation in organizations through the development of 
local party branches, and the close cooperation with trade unions.  
For explaining the high levels of trust in Scandinavia researchers such as 
Rothstein (2004a) claims that this is in fact a result of actual politics of the impartial 
implementation by the public administration. This is thus also related to the 
universalism of the welfare state that contributes to making the impartial 
implementation easier than for instance systems with means testing. Further Trägårdh 
(Trägårdh, 2007a) argues that the corporatism and the use of government commissions 
contributes to creating trust. Hence, both the arguments for explaining the 
development of high levels of trust are based on politics.  
In regards to the two last points concerning the capacity of and trust in 
government institutions, the independent public administration and the combination of 
a strong state and strong local governments, can primarily be explained by looking at 
historical structures in pre-democratic Scandinavia. Still, Rose (2004: 180) also argues 
that the already existing strong local governments have been viewed as an active tool 
for the central state in the pursuit of policy goals, and thus partly explains it as a 
strategy of the state for securing legitimacy.  
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In sum, the situation that are mapped in Scandinavia relating to these issues 
appears to boil down to a combination of in some cases already existing structures, and 
a primacy of political action to further develop popular participation. In some areas 
such as the development of the universal welfare state, this primacy of politics seems 
to be particularly important as an explanation.  
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7 Thematic Comparison of Aceh and Scandinavia 
 
In this chapter the aim is to answer the research question: what, if any, 
Scandinavian historical experiences can be used as a source of inspiration in efforts 
to improve the condition of democratic representation in Aceh?  
In the previous chapter the aim was to investigate some of the processes behind 
developments that are believed to have been essential in the development of 
democratic popular representation in Scandinavia. The findings were that most of 
these developments involved the existence of some essential structural preconditions, 
but it also seems that some of the processes to a large extent are results of political 
decisions and an active state.   
 When analysing Scandinavian experiences on the basis of problems generated 
in the context of Aceh, it has become clear that the conditions in pre-democratic 
Scandinavia were not that different from the conditions in Aceh today. Further the 
analysis has shown that Scandinavia in fact have some experiences with fighting or 
overcoming problems related to some of the areas deemed to be problematic for the 
development of popular representation in Aceh. Moreover, recent research on 
Scandinavian democracy finds that the chains of representation are being weakened 
and that there are tendencies towards a fragmentation of governance. Because of these 
common problems with assuring the aim of democracy through popular representation, 
it is clear that by way of more comparative thematic studies, it should indeed be 
possible both for Aceh to draw some lessons from Scandinavia, but also the other way 
around, that Scandinavia can draw some lessons as well.  
To be able to answer if Aceh can actually learn from Scandinavia, more 
research is needed though. What can be done on the basis of this analysis is to make 
some suggestions about which specific historical processes in the development of 
popular representation than might be relevant for Aceh. Because of the differences in 
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contexts, and the fact that it is not possible to construct a set of preconditions, I will 
focus on what can be called a primacy of politics.  
7.1 Sources of Inspiration: the Primacy of Politics 
When analyzing the processes leading to the establishment of features essential 
for the democratic participation in Scandinavia, the most essential factor for explaining 
many of the developments seems to be the actual policies of the social democratic 
parties in the 1930s and after the Second World War. The social democratic parties 
also played an important role for the development of the high levels of participation in 
organizations and trade unions. Further, the developments towards social corporatism, 
high levels of participation in organizations, high levels of trust in the state and the 
combination of strong local governments and a strong state with capacities to 
implement policy, are all explained at least partially by an active role of the state. The 
main lessons from Scandinavia that thus could be suggested as some sources of 
inspiration for the further development of popular representation in Aceh could firstly 
be the importance played by political parties with electorates based in mass-
organizations, and a close cooperation with trade unions, and secondly the important 
role that has been played by the state in these developments.  
During the discussions with the research team in South Aceh, a more specific 
recommendation was the formation of comprehensive development committees for 
planning and facilitating welfare based growth and consisting of relevant experts and 
‘stakeholders’, in addition to a parallel public investment bank operating on basis of 
market principles, but in accordance with long term guarantees to the committee. This 
recommendation was by the local researchers viewed as a feasible solution that in fact 
would address many of the problems in South Aceh (Törnquist, 2010e: 12).  
The approach to democracy in Indonesia are as mentioned earlier affected by a 
liberal focus on decentralization, cooperation with NGOs, and civil society 
organizations as the main way of promoting participation. Thus, the lessons from this 
analysis is that in the case of Scandinavia, the relative success of democratic 
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participation seems to be founded in the importance of a strong state with capacities, 
and participation through political organizations closely related to the state through 
corporatist institutions. The tendencies that are taking place today with the weakening 
of these factors are in turn seen as problematic in relation to the democratic chain of 
governance. A change in the participation towards less political parties, and more civil 
society are seen as weakening popular representation, and globalization and the 
existence of an increasing number of NGOs are leading to a fragmentation of the 
public matters. There is thus also a potentially very important lesson for Scandinavia 
as well in this research, in the sense that for sustaining vital elements of the 
Scandinavian model for democracy, there is also a need for investigating how this 
model can fit into a global context (Törnquist, 2010e: 5). 
 
7.1.1 Recent Experiences from Other Contexts 
Törnquist (2010e: 11) argues that in addition to investigating the combating of 
similar problems as the ones identified in Aceh, decades ago in Scandinavia, another 
and much more recent is the efforts at decentralised participatory governance in Brazil 
and in the Indian state of Kerala.  
In Harriss’ (2006) research on cities in India and South America he finds that in 
Latin American cities such as Sao Paulo and Porto Alegre where there has been 
successful participatory budgeting, there exists an associative network which link state 
and societal actors through interpersonal, media and/or inter-organizational ties. He 
also argues that this would not have been possible without the support and 
involvement from political parties, so that the “new” politics of civil society is actually 
closely linked with the “old” politics of political parties (Harriss, 2006: 10).  
Further it is pointed out that in historical experiences from contexts such as 
Latin America, Kerala the development of institutional and democratic channels for 
influence was not something that people did by themselves, rather the demands came 
from below but the introduction came from above An implication of this has been that 
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people are given incentives to form popular movements for organizing through these 
channels instead of turning to lobbying, individual strongmen and political bosses 
(Baiocchi & Heller, 2009; Tharakan, 2004).  
Also studies from United States and Italy indicate that significant developments 
in civil society seem to have followed from rather than to have given rise to significant 
developments through state and politics (Skockpol 1992; Fiorina and Skocpol 1999; 
Tarrow 1994, cited in Harriss, et al., 2004a: 15). Thus, there is a need for not only 
community initiatives from below but the actually implementation from above also.  
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8 Concluding Remarks  
The background for the analysis in this thesis has been the recent 
democratization in Indonesia that has led to impressive and extensive freedoms, and 
the successful holding of elections. On the other hand, recent research on the state of 
democracy in Indonesia has found that there are some severe challenges for democracy 
in Indonesia. More specific research on the tsunami-affected and conflict-ridden Aceh 
province on north Sumatra, indicate that a lot of the problems with the deepening and 
further development of democracy, is related to a need to extend the representation 
beyond the formal holding of elections, and a need to promote democratic 
participation from below (Törnquist, et al., 2010). Another ongoing study in the South 
Aceh district in the Aceh province aims to map what actually exists of additional 
forms of representation and participation.   
By taking the definition of democracy as popular control over public affairs on 
the basis of political equality as a point of departure as well as Törnquist’s (2009d) 
theoretical framework for the conceptualization of democracy, the aim has been to 
perform an ‘upside down’ comparison of democratic representation in Aceh and 
historically in Scandinavia. The logic behind the comparison has been that instead of 
taking the relative successful democracy in Scandinavia as a point of departure for 
assessing democracy in Aceh, I have firstly identified some problems with democratic 
representation in Aceh, and then used these as a point of departure for analyzing 
Scandinavian experiences to see if any similar problems have been handled or solved. 
 The empirical background for identifying the problems in Aceh have primarily 
been built on some preliminary research results from the local project in South Aceh, 
but I have also drawn on other literature on Aceh and Indonesia in general.   
The problems with democratic representation in Aceh appeared to be related to 
three overarching problems of an unclear relationship between the demos and the 
public affairs, an insufficiency of democratic intermediary channels for people to 
exercise popular control, and a lack of capacity of and trust in the government 
institutions. After specifying these problems in Aceh, the general situation in 
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Scandinavia relating to the same issues was mapped.  Further, the relative successful 
establishment of some of these issues in Scandinavia seemed to be related to some 
additional factors: The social corporatist system, the universal welfare state, the 
extensive participation in organizations, high levels of trust in the state, transparent 
public administration and lastly a combination of strong local authorities and a strong 
state. Moreover, there are recent tendencies towards the weakening of the democratic 
representation in Scandinavia, and some of the challenges faced are not that different 
from those that Aceh are facing.  
The development of these deemed to be important factors in Scandinavia was in 
turn investigated further by aiming at tracing the processes behind the establishment of 
them. Some of these processes seemed to be related to some structural preconditions in 
pre-democratic Scandinavia, while other issues were clearly related to actual politics 
and active state intervention. The next step was thus to perform a thematic comparison 
of Aceh and Scandinavia where the possibilities for any of the findings serving as 
potential sources for inspiration for the further development of democracy in Aceh.  
The general conclusion is that some of the processes were especially important 
in Scandinavia: the active role of the state and the active role of the social democratic 
party. These are tendencies that are in contrast to the focus in Indonesia on 
decentralization and participation through civil society. Moreover these are also some 
of the issues that Scandinavia is facing challenges with due to globalization and recent 
developments. 
In addition to drawing on experiences from Scandinavia, some more recent 
experiences from Brazil and India with participatory budgeting were discussed. The 
interesting part is that also in these cases there was a clear tendency of the importance 
of combining the initiatives from below with implementation from above by a strong 
state or through an alliance with political parties.   
In conclusion, there seems to be some points that could serve as inspiration for 
further developing democracy in Aceh. Equally interesting is it that there seems to also 
be lessons for Scandinavia in how the Scandinavian model can be sustained in a global 
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context (Törnquist, 2010e: 5). This of course will need to be subject to further 
research.     
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